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Quand je vais dans un pays, je n'examine pas s'il y
a de bonnes lois, mais si on execute celles qui y
sont, car il y a de bonnes lois partout.1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Constitutionalism in Canada and Argentina has been strongly
influenced by the United States. However, as all three constitu1. Montesquieu, quoted in Bernard Laprade, Le droit i un remade utile: La presentation du thme, in VUES CANADIENNES IT EUROPENNES DES DROITS ET LIBERT S 223 (GeraldA. Beaudoin ed., 1989).
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tional regimes were born out of idiosyncratic circumstances parallels among them can be misleading. In particular, the civil law tradition present in Argentina must be distinguished from the
common law roots of the U.S. and Canadian systems.'
In the area of constitutional remedies, surprisingly perhaps,
Argentine courts have proved themselves to be as inventive as
their common law counterparts. The most striking example of this
judicial activism is the creation of the writ of amparo designed to
provide judicial protection from human rights violations. Canadian
courts, on the other hand, have been very reluctant to arrogate
powers not specifically granted to them by Parliament. Only lately
have they adopted a more aggressive stance following the inception
in 1982 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter).' Despite the presence of a broad remedial provision in Section
24(1) of the Charter, Canadian courts have been slow to create protective mechanisms comparable to amparo which would provide
fast and simple enforcement of fundamental human rights. Traditional remedies such as injunctions and mandamus were developed
in a different context involving private rights rather than constitutionally entrenched public rights, and thus suffer from limitations
making them ill-equipped to fully give life to the supreme law of
the land. Nevertheless, courts in Canada are hesitant to abandon
these remedies, which for centuries have stood as a bulwark protecting individuals from the tyranny of the state. This article attempts to lay the foundation for a much-needed constitutional
remedy under the Charter. It does so by borrowing from the Argentine amparo the elements that are both compatible with and
necessary to the full implementation of constitutional guarantees
in Canada.
The introduction in 1982 of the Canadian Charter provided
the judiciary with a new constitutional instrument with broad powers over many aspects of Canadian life. While sustained attention
was given to the main body of the Charter's substantive rights, relatively little consideration was given to the remedy provision of
that instrument. Section 24 of the Charter, regarding enforcement,
provides that:
2. Canadian private law is part civil law (in Quebec) and part common law (in the rest
of Canada). Canadian public law, on the other hand, is wholly rooted in the public law of
England.
3. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) [hereinafter Charter].
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(1) Anyone whose rights and freedoms, as guaranteed by this
Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of
competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.
(2) Where, in the proceedings under subsection (1), a court concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or
denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the
evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard
to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings
4
would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The first paragraph of that provision, the main object of the present study, was included in the Charter to ensure that the unfortunate experience of the Canadian Bill of Rights5 would not be
repeated.
The shortcomings of the Canadian Bill of Rights are illustrated by the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Hogan v.
The Queen.' In this action, the Court found that although there
had been a denial of the accused's right to counsel, there was no
remedial provision available to exclude the illegally obtained evidence, and that it did not lie within the province of the courts to
create one. The timid approach of the Canadian Supreme Court
led to "that vain thing of a right without a remedy."'7 This deficiency was one of the main concerns leading to the inclusion of
Section 24 in the Charter.'
The need for an explicit remedial provision to avoid situations
4. The French text reads:
(1) Toute personne victime de violation ou de negation des droits et libertks qui
lui sont garantis par la pr~sente charte, peut s'adresser & un tribunal comp6tent
pour obtenir la rparation que le tribunal estime convenable et juste eu 6gard
aux circonstances.
(2) Lorsque, dans une instance vis~e au paragraphe (1), le tribunal a conclut que
des 6lments de preuve ont t& obtenus dans des conditions qui portent attainte
aux droits ou liberts garantis par La pr6sente charte, ces 6lments de preuve
sont 6cart~s s'il est 6tabli, eu 6gard aux circonstances, que leur utilisation est
susceptible de d~consid~rer l'administration de Ia justice.
Charter, pt. I, §§ 24(1), 24(2). The French and English text provided here-are both regarded
as official versions of the law. Both have played an important role in the interpretation of
the provision by Canadian courts.
5. Canadian Bill of Rights, R.S.C., app. III (1985), 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, ch.44 (Can.).
6. [1975] 2 S.C.R. 754 (Can.).
7. Ashby v. Whithe, 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 136 (K.B. 1703) (Holt, C.J., dissenting).
8. For an interesting analysis of the various stages in the development of section 24, see
A. Anne McLellan & Bruce P. Elman, The Enforcement of the CanadianCharter of Rights
and Freedoms: An Analysis of Section 24, 21 ALBERTA L. REV [ALTA. L. REV.] 205, 206-08
(1983).
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such as the one in Hogan was not in any sense novel to the law of
human rights at the international level. The Charter follows in the
line of various regional and international human rights instruments adopted after the Second World War, themselves inspired
by the past experiences of countries such as the United States, the
United Kingdom, and France.' Specifically, Section 24 of the Charter derives more or less directly from Article 8 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, providing that: "Everyone has the
right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals
for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by the law." 10 Similar provisions can be found in most
major international or regional human rights agreements, including
Article 2(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 1 Article 13 of the European Convention for the Protection
2
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 18 of the
9. This ancestry was recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada in in re Public Service Employees Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, 348 (Can.); Slaight Communications, Inc. v.

Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, 1056-57 (Can.). See also

ANNE

F.

BAYEFSKY, INTERNATIONAL

122
(1992); M. Le Bel, L'interprtationde la Charte canadiennedes droits et libert~s au regard
du droit international des droits de la personne-Critique de la dtmarche suivie par la
HUMAN

RIGHTS-USE

IN

CANADIAN

Court supreme du Canada, 48

CHARTER OF

REVUE DU BARREAU

RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS LITIGATION

[R.

DU

B.] 743, 756 (1988).

10. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 8, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc., A/810, (1948).
11. Article 2(3) provides:
(3) Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that
the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right
thereto determined by judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or
by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the
State, and to develop the possibility of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies
when granted.
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2(3), G.A. Res. 2200, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
12. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 13, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. [hereinafter European Convention]. Article 13
provides: "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated
shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in official capacity." Id.
This provision was strongly influenced by the text of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights as well as by the Draft of Article 13 of the International Covenant. See Jean
F. Flauss, Le droit d un recours effectif: l'article 13 de la Convention europ~enne des droits
de l'homme dans la jurisprudencede la Commission et de la Cour, in VUES CANADIENNES ET
EUROPAENNES DES DROITS ET LIBERTts

258-59 (G6rald-A. Beaudoin ed., 1989).
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American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 3 and Article 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights. 4
The Charter derives generally from a worldwide movement towards the codification of human rights. More precisely, the origin
of Section 24(1) can be traced to Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 8 was itself directly influenced by
Article 18 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man, adopted in Bogota while the Universal Declaration was being
drafted. Both provisions came into existence through amendments
advocated by the Mexican delegation, and constitute nothing more
than a reflection of the right of amparo, well known at that time in
Mexico and in a number of other Latin-American countries. It was,
in the words of a justice of the Mexican Federal Supreme Court,
one piece of Mexico's self-attributed "task of conveying to the
world's legal heritage that institution which, as a shield of human
dignity, her own painful history conceived."'"
13. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, May 2, 1948, OEA/Ser.L/V/
II.23/Doc.21/Rev.6 (English 1979), reprinted in 43 AM. J. INT'L L. (Doc. Supp.) 133 (1949).
Article 18 states that "Every person may resort to the courts to ensure respect for his
legal rights. There should likewise be available to him a simple, brief procedure whereby the
courts will protect him from acts of authority that, to his prejudice, violate any fundamental
constitutional rights." Id. at 136.
14. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970). Article 25 provides:
1. Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective
recourse to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate
his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this convention, even though such violation may have been committed by persons acting in the course of their official duties.
2. The State Parties undertake:
a. to ensure that any person claiming such remedy shall have his rights
determined by the competent authority provided for by the legal system
of the state;
b. to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; and
c. to ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies
when granted.
Though these international agreements are not the main topic of the present study, it is
interesting to note that the Supreme Court of Canada stated in in re Public Service Employees Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 (Can.), that the Charter was to be presumed to grant
a protection at least equal to those treaties ratified by Canada, and that the various sources
of international law are to be considered "relevant and persuasive for interpretation of the
Charter's provision." Id. at 348-49. See also Le Bel, supra note 9 passim.
15. Felipe T. Ramirez, The InternationalExpansion of the Mexican Amparo, 1 INTERAM. L. REV. 163, 166 (1959). For a detailed account of the amendment procedure leading to
the adoption of Article 8 of the Universal Declaration and the role played by the Mexican
delegation, see PIERRE MERTENS, LE Daorr DE RECOURS EFFECTIF DEVANT LES INSTANCES NATIONALES EN CAS DE VIOLATION D'UN DROIT DE L'HOMME 19-26 (1973); see also Hector Fix
Zamudio, The Writ of Amparo in Latin-America, 13 LAW. AM. 361, 363 (1981).
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Inspired by the amparo's indirect parentage of Section 24(1)
of the Charter, this article examines the nature of amparo from a
Canadian perspective, concentrating particularly on the law of the
Argentine amparo. It assesses the state of Canada's constitutional
remedies with respect to Section 24(1) of the Charter and ultimately proposes a procedural framework for applications made
pursuant to that provision while keeping the Argentine amparo as
an inspirational background.
II.
A.

THE LATIN-AMERICAN AMPARO EXPERIENCE

Preliminary Considerations

An issue demanding primary attention, while not directly related to the law of amparo itself, but instead to the social and political context in which it exists, is that of chronic political instability and undue influence at the highest level of many LatinAmerican judicial systems. It would not be an uncommon reaction
to wholly dismiss the Latin-American law of amparo based on a
paternalistic fear that the caudillos would not allow for the development of a sound legal theory in the area of public law. Such a
response is by no means devoid of a basis in reality. For example,
scholars relate that between 1935 and 1975, there were in Latin
America more than one hundred successful coups and manifold
more unsuccessful ones"' and that by 1975 the twenty Latin-Amerconstitutions, for an
ican republics had had an aggregate of 246
17
country.
per
twelve
than
more
of
average
These considerations, however, are more in the nature of caveats to be kept in mind during a study of the Latin-American
amparo, rather than sufficient reasons to abstain from uridertaking
such an exercise. Professor Barker discusses this matter in a recent
article and offers a threefold answer to the objection of sceptics.1 8
First, many Latin-American countries have enjoyed prolonged periods of constitutional stability. Indeed, among others Argentina
16. KENNETH L. KARST & KEITH S. ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA
183-222 (Latin American Studies Series No. 28, 1975).
17. RUSSEL FITZGIBBON, LATIN-AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: TEXTUAL CITATIONS 3 (1974),
discussed in Keith S. Rosenn, Judicial Review in Latin America, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 785
(1974). For a more recent account of constitutionalism in Latin America, see Keith S.
Rosenn, The Success of Constitutionalism in the United States and Its Failure in Latin
America: An Explanation, 22 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1 (1990)
18. Robert S. Barker, Constitutionalismin the Americas: A Bicentennial Perspective,
49 U. PITT. L. REV. 891, 893-95 (1988).
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experienced seventy years of uninterrupted constitutional government.1 9 Secondly, many courts have fervently remained independent-minded even in times of political unrest. These courts have
continued to apply the law despite authoritarian rulers, demonstrating that "constitutions do not necessarily disappear when dictators come to power." 0 Thirdly, there is a pervasive tendancy
among Latin-American lawyers and judges to consider dictatorships as unfortunate exceptions and to regard the constitution as
merely suspended.2 1 These conclusions are persuasive, particularly
with respect to Argentina, which will be the main country of reference for this article's study of amparo2 Further, it must be remarked that a nation's judiciary cannot be expected to uphold the
constitution by itself. Such a task depends largely on the executive
branch of government, and particularly on the police, which must
enforce whatever decision the courts render. In this regard, a clear
distinction should be made between the recognition of individual
rights by the courts and the exercise of those rights, which may not
be allowed by the Executive. As one Brazilian judge remarked, the
courts do not have their own "arsenal of shrapnel and torpedoes"
to use if the Executive does not comply with judicial decisions. 3
This second stage of enforcement of judicial decisions does not
necessarily invalidate new legal theories and developments
achieved by the courts, which are the topics of concern of this
article.
19. Id. at 893; see Rosenn, The Success of Constitutionalism,supra note 17, at 31 (listing the constitutions of Latin-American and Caribbean nations as of 1990); see generally
SUSAN CALVERT & PETER CALVERT, ARGENTINA: POLITICAL CULTURE AND INSTABILITY (1989).
20. Barker, supra note 18, at 895. Professor Barker cites as an example the Brazilian
Supreme Federal Tribunal's decision in S.A. Metaldrgica Santo Antonio v. Estado de Minas
Gerais, Recurso Extraordinario [R.E.] 68.661, Tribunal Pleno (STF Dec. 3, 1969) (Braz.),
where that court refused to recognize the validity of an "Institutional Act," purporting to be
superior to the Constitution and severely curtailing the power of judicial review. Barker,
supra note 18, at 894. The author further cites an Argentine decision similarly refusing to
recognize the supra-constitutional character of a revolutionary statute. Barker, supra note
18, at 893 (SA.nchez Sorondo "Azul y Blanco", [1968] JURISPRUDENCIA ARGENTINA [J.A.]. 56
(CSJN 1968) (Arg.), translatedin KARST & ROSENN, supra note 16, at 220-21).
21. Barker, supra note 18, at 895.
22. For further discussion on the question of judicial independence in Mexico and criticism of the political analysis thereof in the United States, see Carl E. Schwarz, The Mexican Writ of Amparo and ExtraordinaryJudicial Remedies Against Official Abuse in the
United States: A ComparativeAnalysis 20-27 (1971) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University
of California in Santa Barbara, available at U.C. Berkeley Law Library).
23. Nelson Hungria, quoted in INTER-AMER. BAR ASSOC., PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH
CONFERENCE 205, 211 (1957), cited in Rosenn, JudicialReview in Latin America, supra note
17, at 813-14 n.139.
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Before considering the Argentine law of amparo, tribute must
be paid to that law's origins in Mexico, "the land of amparo,""
where the writ first appeared before spreading throughout Latin
America.
B.

The Development of Amparo in Mexico

The writ of amparo, which has been described as "the most
2' 5
Mexican institution of the whole of positive Mexican law," developed in two stages. The first consisted of the initial conception and
inclusion of the right of amparo in the Mexican Constitution of
1848. The second brought refinements and complications to
amparo in that country.
1. The Early Development of Amparo
Amparo was born out of the Mexican Revolutionary War at
the beginning of the nineteenth century. Although Mexico is the
birthplace of amparo, the idea of judicial review of government action embodied in this new mechanism was strongly influenced by
American thought. The idea was first introduced in Mexico
through the Spanish translation of Alexis de Tocqueville's famed
work, Democracy in America, which became available in Mexico in
1837, a mere three years before the appearance of amparo. The
compatibility of the American model with the Mexican legal system is explained in the following terms:
In the first quarter of the nineteenth century, when most of
Latin America won its independence, the United States was a
young but established country. Like the new nations of Latin
America, it had endured a long period of colonial rule under a
European monarchy and had fought a successful war against its
mother country in the name of liberty. The affinity created by
similar colonial and revolutionary experiences was reinforced
by philosophical attitudes prevalent when2 6 the Latin-American
republics were writing their constitutions.
24.

ENRIQUE VEscovi, Los RECURSOS JUDICIALES Y ADEMAS MEDIOS IMPUGNATIVOS EN

468 (1988).
25. Carlos Echanove Trujillo, La procedure Mexicaine d'amparo, 1 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARt [R.I.D.C.] 229, 248 (1949)(calling amparo "l'institution la plus mexicaine de tout le droit mexicain"). On the Mexican amparo generally, see IGNACIO BURGOA,
EL JuIcIO DE AMPARO (24th ed. 1988).
26. Barker, supra note 18, at 896-97 (emphasis added).
IBERIROAMftRICA
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The American influence was by no means an exclusive one, and it
has been shown that at least the French, British, and Spanish traditions also played significant roles.2 7
The first chapter in the story of amparo involves Manuel
Crecencio Rej6n in 1840. At the time an active politician at the
federal level, Rej6n decided to return to his native state of YucatAn where a rebellion against the central authority in Mexico City
had led to the secession of the state from the rest of Mexico. As
the head of the constitutional reform commission, Rej6n proposed
to include a judicial review procedure in the new supreme law of
the state. The aim of the procedure was to give state courts a tool
powerful enough to effectively protect individuals against abuses
from the state.2 s The provision included in the 1841 Yucatan Constitution gave direct jurisdiction to the state's highest court to review the constitutionality of acts of the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches of government.
A few years later, in 1846, Rej6n went back to Mexico City to
participate in the drafting of the new national constitution. He
took with him his experience with amparo and proposed its inclusion in the federal constitution, basically along the same lines
adopted in the YucatAn state constitution. The main thrust to
adopt this new procedure at the federal level came, however, from
another politician: Mariano Otero. Largely through Otero's efforts,
the procedure was adopted with some modifications, the most important of which were embodied in what came to be known as the
"Otero formula," Article 25 of the new Mexican Constitution:
The Courts of the Federation will protect [amparAn] any inhabitant of the Republic in his exercise and conservation of those
rights conceded to him by the Constitution and the constitutional laws, against all assaults of the Legislative and Executive
Branches, on the federal as well as the state levels; such courts
will be limited to granting protection in particular cases, over
that which shall be revealed by the record of the trial, without
27. Id. at 901; see also VESCOVI, supra note 24, at 471 & n.24; Alberto F. Garay, Federalism, the Judiciary and Constitutional Adjudication in Argentina: A Comparison with
the U.S. Constitutional Model, 22 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 161 (1991). There are En-

glish language publications containing an extensive review of all the possible sources of

amparo, including the Greek and Roman antecedents. See RICHARD D. BAKER, JUDIcIAL REVIEW IN MEXICO: A STUDY OF THE AMPARO SUIT 27-34 (1971); Schwarz, supra note 22, at 2936; Hector Fix Zamudio, A Brief Introduction to the Mexican Writ of Amparo, 9 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 306, 309-10 (1979).

28. Echanove Trujillo, supra note 25, at 236.
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making any general declaration with respect to the law or act
which motivates [the complaint].,9
The Mexican Constitution entrusts federal courts, and more specifically the Supreme Federal Court, with the task of applying the
national amparo. However, contrary to Rej6n's model, Article 25 of
the Mexican Constitution provides that amparo does not lie
against acts of the Judicial branch. It must also be noted that the
prohibition of general declaration of unconstitutionality found in
Article 25 conforms both with the civil law tradition and with the
wish to avoid clashes between the Judiciary and the other two
branches of government. 30
The revolutionary Constitution of 1856 further modified the
constitutional law of amparo by subjecting judicial decisions to review through amparo, as Rej6n's original model had previously
done. In 1917, at the inception of the extant Mexican Constitution,
the breadth of amparo was again enlarged to permit review on the
31
ground that a judge had wrongly interpreted the law. This translated into a de plano right to appeal any judgment directly to the
Federal Supreme Court through amparo, since a losing litigant
would rarely fail to argue that the judge has incorrectly interpreted
the law.3" Finally, beginning in 1861, various statutes detailing the
procedure and limits of the writ of amparo were from time to time
enacted pursuant to the Constitution, as found necessary to manage the ever-growing complexity of that body of law.
2.

The Nature and Components of the Mexican Amparo
Amparo was conceived as an all-purpose protective mechanism

29. Acta de Reformas del 18 de Mayo de 1847, translatedin Schwarz, supra note 22, at
38 (emphasis added). As its name suggests, "Acta de Reformas" is an amendment to the
Mexican Constitution of 1824.
30. Echanove Trujillo, supra note 25, at 242. The concept of stare decisis is foreign to
the Civil law tradition, so a judicial declaration of unconstitutionality, valid erga omnes,
would run contrary to the principle that court decisions do not constitute precedent binding
in other cases. Meanwhile, the desire to avoid clashes between the judiciary and other
branches of government was inherited from continental Europe where the rules laid out by
Montesquieu in De l'esprit des lois were strictly applied. Barker, supra note 18, at 902-05.
31. Article 14 of the 1914 Mexican Constitution reads in part: "In civil suits the final
judgment shall be according to the letter or the juridical interpretationof the law; in the
absence of the latter it shall be based on the general principles of law." MEX.CONST. OF 1914
art. 14, translated in Schwarz, supra note 22, at 62 (emphasis added).
32. See Echanove Trujillo, supra note 25, at 244-45; Fix Zamudio, supra note 27, at
313-16.

704

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:3

designed to enforce individual rights against any act or statutory
provision originating from a public authority. One of the most
striking characteristics of amparo is that it lies directly in the Federal Supreme Court,"3 which accordingly has original jurisdiction
to entertain certain amparo claims, called "direct amparo." Recent
amendments to the Law of Amparo have resulted in concurrent
jurisdiction between the Supreme Court and the federal collegiate
circuit courts, which are analogous to the United States circuit
courts of appeals. In addition to "direct amparo," there exists an
"indirect amparo" whereby the applicant must initially seek redress in the local federal district courts. Whether a claim can be
brought as a direct or indirect amparo will depend, as explained
below, on its nature. The amparo is brought by the victim or by a
representative if the victim is unable to attend. Again, the procedural steps will vary according to the kind of amparo sought, from
the most informal oral petition, even by telephone, to a strict written procedure laden with delays. 4 Two procedural rules are applied in this respect. First, a defect in the procedure will be corrected proprio motu by the court for certain types of amparo when
the applicant is indigent, underage, or incapacitated (suplencia de
la deficiencia de la queja), s Second, consistent with the civil law's
recourse in cassation, appellate courts are generally limited to curing the defects only to the extent that these defects are assigned in
the procedure as "errors" and are of a purely legal character (principle of "strict law" or "derecho estricto").36 An interlocutory order may be issued if irreparable harm would ensue otherwise, but
such an order must always take into consideration the general interests of society. 7 The final decision binds only the parties to
amparo, but five successive decisions of the Federal Supreme
Court or the collegiate circuit courts in agreement on a point of law
will create a binding precedent.3 8
33. The Federal Supreme Court of Mexico is a continental European-type supreme
court, divided into four chambers of five judges (ministros), sometimes sitting en banc. Fix
Zamudio, supra note 27, at 333-34.
34. Rosenn, Judicial Review in Latin America, supra note 17, at 797. This will be the
case primarily for direct amparo challenges which involve the constitutionality of statutes
and which are heard in the Federal Supreme Court.
35. Hector Fix Zamudio, La reforma en el derecho de amparo, in REFORMA PROCESAL:
ESTUDIbS EN MEMORIA DE NICETo ALCALA-ZAMORA Y CASTILLo 265, 289-90 (1987).
36. This principle of strict law or stricti juris is analyzed and criticized at length in
BAKER, supra note 27, at 185-95.
37. Fix Zamudio, supra note 27, at 339-40.
38. Id. at 346-47. This rule stems from a statute establishing which decisions will be
considered precedents (jurisprudencia)in conformity with article 107 of the Mexican Con-
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There are five general categories of amparo writs in Mexico.
These categories are designed to cover any illegality by any official
in any situation, with few explicit exceptions. s9
a.

The Liberty Amparo (amparo de libertad)

This is the original form of amparo, designed to protect individuals against violation of the right to life, liberty, deportation or
banishment, as well as some other forms of punishment described
in Article 22 of the Mexican Constitution. 0 Liberty Amparo is an
"indirect" form of the writ which must be presented in the federal
collegiate circuit courts, leading to a court order suspending the act
that impinges upon the right.
b.

The Constitutionality Amparo (amparo contra leyes)

As its name indicates, this recourse takes the form of an attack on the constitutionality of a statute. This amparo must be
subdivided into two classes. The first class, the "action in unconstitutionality" of the law, inspired by the American judicial review
proceeding, consists of a frontal attack on the adoption and promulgation of the impugned statute. Similar to the Liberty Amparo,
the Constitutionality Amparo is an "indirect amparo" and is thus
brought in the local federal district court. The decision of that
court may be appealed to the Federal Supreme Court. The Constitutionality Amparo will lie only against self-executing laws, or, in
other words, statutes creating duties without the necessity of an
intervening act by the Executive."1 The second class, the "recourse
in unconstitutionality," is an incidental attack on the constitutionality of a statute which served as the basis of a judicial decision.
This action is provided for by Article 73 of the Constitution, itself
directly inspired from Article VI of the United States Constitution,
which directs judges to apply the Constitution despite any constitution, a provision by nature most alien to common law thinking. Article 107 of the Mexican Constitution provides: "The law shall specify the terms and cases in which the precedents of the courts of the federal judicial branch are binding, as well as the requirement for
their modification." MEX. CONST. art 107.
39. These exceptions deal primarily with expropriation, expulsion of aliens, state of
emergency, and "political questions." BAKER, supra note 27, at 131-63.
40. These punishments include mutilation, branding, flogging, beating with sticks, torture, excessive fines, and confiscation of property. See Fix Zamudio, supra note 27, at 317.
41. BAKER, supra note 27, at 167-68; Fix Zamudio, supra note 27, at 320-21.
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trary law.4 2 The recourse is a direct amparo brought before the
Federal Supreme Court or the collegial circuit courts, depending
on the subject-matter and the monetary amount in controversy.
For both classes of constitutionality amparo, the resulting declaration of unconstitutionality is not erga omnes. Rather, its effects
extend only to the case at bar.
c.

The Judicial or "Cassation" Amparo

This category of amparo, based on Article 14 of the Mexican
Constitution, is aimed at the legality and constitutionality of a judicial interpretation. 43 Mexican courts have construed this provision to imply that any judicial or quasi-judicial decision can be reviewed through amparo to verify the validity of a point of law. It
has thus become a constitutional right to have one's statutory
rights decided on the basis of a valid judicial interpretation.
Amparo suits arising under this rule can be used to challenge the
application of any federal or state law by a judicial or administrative body, but only in final decisions or interlocutory decisions
which could adversely affect the final outcome." This class of
amparo entrusts the Federal Supreme Court with the task of interpreting all laws. Its jurisdiction, unlike that of the U.S. Supreme
Court, is not limited by a "federal question" requirement. This
mechanism has thus allowed the Federal Supreme Court of Mexico, in a fashion similar to its Canadian counterpart, to direct the
judicial development of Mexican law as a whole. Judicial Amparo
is subject to the rigidly applied "strict law" rule described above,
so as to allow review only on points of law and topreclude de novo
42. Article 73 of the Mexican Constitution reads:
This Constitution, the laws of the Congress of the Union that emanate therefrom and all treaties that have been made and shall be made therewith by the
President of the Republic, with the approval of the Senate, shall be the supreme
law of the whole Union. The judges of each State shall conform to the said Constitution, the laws and treaties, in spite of any contrary provisions that may appear in the constitution or laws of the states.
MEX. CONST. art. 73, translated in Fix Zamudio, supra note 27, at 322, n.76.
Paragraph 2 of Article VI of the United States Constitution provides:
This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
the Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
43. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
44. BAKER, supra note 27, at 175-96; Fix Zamudio, supra note 27, at 323-25.
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decisions. This interpretation of Article 14 of the Mexican Constitution has had the general effect of drowning the Federal Supreme
Court with amparo proceedings."
d. The Administrative Amparo (amparo como contenciosoadministrativo)
Since Mexico lacks a national procedure for the judicial review
of administrative action similar to the kinds found in most countries of Anglo-American tradition, individuals whose rights are
abused by a final administrative decision may have no remedy
other than the writ of amparo. However, all forms of administrative review procedure must be exhausted before recourse to
amparo is permitted. 4 6 The Administrative Amparo is an indirect
amparo which is presented first in a district court for review of
points of law only.
e. The Agrarian Amparo (amparo en matera agraria, ejidal
y comunal)
This is a special amparo designed to protect the small landowners and native Indians and their rights under the agrarian reform laws. The agrarian amparo is generally more lenient towards
the petitioner with respect to procedural errors. It is from this
class of amparo (and the criminal amparo) that the rule of
suplencia de las deficiencias de la queja was initially developed
allowing courts to cure procedural defects sua sponte.47
The very wide reach of the Mexican amparo is its strength
and, at the same time, its weakness. The writ has succeeded in becoming an instrument that corrects nearly any infringement on individual rights by any branch of government. On the other hand,
its availability has also meant a flooding of the Federal Supreme
Court with amparo proceedings, particularly after it became possi45. See Rosenn, Judicial Review in Latin America, supra note 17, at 798.
46. There is a system of administrative review similar to the French or German administrative review procedure, but only at the federal level. The Tribunal fiscal de la Federaci6n is modelled after the French Conseil priv and enjoys general review jurisdiction over
all actions of the federal public service. The Tribunal's own decisions are reviewable through
amparo. See Fix Zamudio, supra note 27, at 325-27.
47. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. See also Fix Zamudio, supra note 27, at
327-29.
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ble to use amparo to challenge judicial decisions. 4 1 There has thus
been in the last decade an effort to reduce the role of the Federal
Supreme Court by giving it discretion to have the collegiate circuit
courts hear most cases, while granting leave or certiorari only to
those amparo suits involving legal, social, or economic matters of
transcending national importance. 49 A further consequence of the
versatility of amparo has been the ease with which it adapts to
many different settings. This multiple application of amparo, however, has resulted in complex procedural rules leading to numerous
calls for their simplification. 50 One change that has been introduced is the extension of the rule of suplencia de las deficiencias
de la queja to cover cases beyond those of agrarian and criminal
amparo. The availability and complexity of the amparo procedure
have overloaded court dockets, leading to the use of amparo as a
dilatory tactic by unscrupulous litigants and lawyers. Reforms in
1984 and 1986 imposed strict fines in order to curb these unethical
tactics. Finally, some suggest doing away with the "Otero formula"
and allowing the Supreme Court to render general declarations of
51
unconstitutionality.
Generally, the law of amparo has transcended the law of judicial review in Mexico, if not Mexican public law as a whole.
C.

The Argentine Amparo

From Mexico, the institution of amparo spread with unequal
rapidity throughout the rest of Latin America. Today, in one form
or another, the writ is applied in Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru.52 Two additional countries have substantially de48. Over 53,000 amparo suits were filed in the federal district courts alone from December 1969 to December 1970, and in 1968 there was a backlog of more than 20,000 amparo
cases in the Mexican Supreme Court. These numbers, however, were significantly reduced
by numerous amendments to the Constitution and the Law of Amparo. KARST & ROSENN,
supra note 16, at 131-32.
49. Section 25 of the Ley Orginica del Poder Judicial de ]a Federaci6n, quoted in
Juventino V. Castro, La reforma procesal en el juicio de arnparo,in REFORMA PROCESAL,
supra note 35, at 260. The Second Chamber of the Supreme Court, dealing with administrative questions, has possessed such discretionary power since 1967. In 1983, this discretion
was extended to the other chambers dealing with criminal, civil, and labor cases, as well as
to the Court sitting en banc on constitutional matters. Fix Zamudio, supra note 35, at 28889, 299.
50. Fix Zamudio, supra note 35, at 280-83.
51. Fix Zamudio announces this change as inevitable. Id. at 297-98.
52. For a brief review of amparo in these countries, see Fix Zamudio, supra note 15, at
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veloped similar procedures. The first is Brazil with the writ of
security (mandado de seguranca), derived from the writ of habeas
corpus and the Mexican amparo.58 The second is Argentina, whose
amparo has generated more jurisprudential and legislative writing
6
than any other derivative of the Mexican amparo. Professor Vescovi writes of the proliferation of amparo:
Es decir que se puede afirmar, a manera conclusiva, que el
amparo que tuvo su origen en M~jico, se ha difundido en todos
los paises del arMa, pero en un andlisis comparativo debemos
seitalar que en esta difusi6n el instituto no recoge la extensi6n
mejicana. Al contrario, en casi todo los paises, se limita a su
funci6n natural de protecci6n de las libertades fundamentales
por medio de un proceso rdpido y eficaz.5s
Latin-American countries have thus not merely adopted the Mexican writ, but have adapted it to their own needs, thereby contributing to the development of what is now a truly Latin-American
procedure. In view of its particular importance as well as its institutional and legal context, the Argentine Amparo deserves a closer
look. The following will thus describe how it came about, and then
analyze some of its most striking features, which, as the article will
demonstrate, are both interesting and relevant to the Canadian
context.
1. Development of Amparo in Argentina
Interestingly enough, as with its evolution in Mexico, amparo
in Argentina originated at the provincial level some three decades
36
before it became accepted at the federal constitutional level. Until the second half of the twentieth century, the only federal recourses available in Argentina were the general action in unconsti365-80.
53. Some hispanophone scholars have indeed translated the Portuguese mandado de
seguranca as mandamiento de amparo in Spanish. Id. at 380. For a discussion of the Brazilian writ of security, see VEscovi, supra note 24, at 489-98.
54. Fix Zamudio, supra note 15, at 368.
55. V.scovi, supra note 24, at 474 ("Thus, it can be conclusively stated that amparo,
initially developed in Mexico, has now spread throughout [South America]. A comparative
analysis reveals, however, that this dissemination did not carry with it the full extension of
amparo in Mexico. On the contary, in nearly every country, amparo was restricted to its
natural purpose of protecting fundamental freedoms through fast and effective
proceedings.").
56. Amparo appeared in the Constitution of the Province of Santa Fe in 1921. Fix
Zamudio, supra note 15, at 368.

710

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:3

tutionality (leading to a declaration that a statute was contrary to
the supreme law of the land) 57 and the writ of habeas corpus (enforcing the right to physical liberty). Aware of the expansion of
habeas corpus in neighboring Brazil and of the success of amparo
in Mexico, many litigants attempted to protect rights other than
that of physical liberty through habeas corpus, but to no avail. 58
Thus, an individual deprived of a right other than physical liberty,
was left with the "ordinary course of administrative and judicial
' 59
proceedings; which was arduous, expensive, and lengthy.
In Angel Siri,e0 the owner and director of a newspaper challenged the order of an undisclosed higher authority which closed
his newspaper for no apparent reason. The lower court found that
both the freedom of the press and the right to work had been violated, but that habeas corpus could not be granted in such a situation given that the physical liberty of the applicant was not involved. The Supreme Court of Justice reversed the lower court to
grant an order directing the police to cease the forced closure of
the paper, and in so doing, laid the foundation of the Argentine
law of amparo. Simply put, the Court reasoned that even absent a
specific provision granting the right to redress, such an accessory
right was necessarily implied in the Argentine Constitution:
[I]ndividual guarantees exist and protect individuals by their
simple entrenchment in the Constitution and independently of
any regulatory statutes . . . .Declarations, rights and guarantees are not, as one may be led to believe, mere theoretical formulas .... Constitutional precepts as well as the institutional
experience of the country jointly demand the full enjoyment and
exercise of individual guarantees for an effective vigor of the
rule of law, and impose upon the country's judges the duty of
insuring them. 1
57. This action was introduced in 1863 and was first exercised in 1887. It was largely

inspired by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See VESCOVI, supra note 24, at 384, 407; Thomas E. Roberts, Note,
The Writ of Amparo: A Remedy to Protect ConstitutionalRights in Argentina, 31 OHIO ST.
L.J. 831, 834 (1970).
58. This phase of Argentine jurisprudence is analyzed in GE9RMAN BIDART CAMPOS, RtGIMEN LEGAL Y JURISPRUDENCIAL DEL AMPARO 43-57 (1968); Josi. LAZZARINI, EL JuIcIO DE
AMPARO 15-33 (1967).
59. KARST & ROSENN, supra note 16, at 161.
60. Judgment of Dec. 27, 1957, Angel Siri, CSJN, 239 Fallos de la Corte Suprema de
Justicia de la Naci6n [Fallos] 459 (1958) (Arg.).
61. Id. at 463-64.
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The Court explained in a later decision6" that the legal basis of
such a conclusion was to be found in Article 33 of the Argentine
Constitution, a provision similar to Section 26 of the Canadian
Charter.6 3 Some commentators have suggested that this sudden departure from a long line of established precedent was linked to the
overthrow of the Peron dictatorship three years before, and to the
subsequent replacement of many members of the Supreme Court
of Justice. 4
A few months later, the Supreme Court rendered a second
landmark decision in the case of Samuel Kot,65 refining the new
law of amparo. In Kot, the owner of a textile factory sought to
regain access to his plant, illegally occupied by striking workers.
The Court's decision expanded the scope of amparo to cover the
infringement on fundamental rights stemming from acts of individuals. The Court reasoned:
There is nothing in either the letter or the spirit of the Constitution that might permit the assertion that the protection of
"human rights"-so called because they are the basic rights of
man-is confined to attacks by official authorities. Neither is
there anything to authorize the assertion that an illegal, serious,
and open attack against any of the rights that make up liberty
in the broad sense, would lack adequate constitutional protecfrom other
tion because of the single fact that the attack comes
66
individuals.
of
groups
organized
or
persons
private
This constitutes a most significant departure from the principle
laid down in the Mexican law of amparo, where the writ will lie
only against acts of a public authority.
62. Judgment of Sept. 5, 1958, S.R.L. Samuel Kot, CSJN, 241 Fallos 291 (1958) (Arg.).
63. Article 33 of the Argentine Constitution reads: "The declarations, rights, and guarantees enumerated in this Constitution shall not be construed to deny other rights and
guarantees not enumerated, but shall be regarded as stemming from the principle of popular
sovereignty and from a republican form of government." CONSTITUcI6N ARGENTINA [CONST.
ARG.] art. 33, translated in Fix Zamudio, supra note 15, at 370 n.31.
Section 26 of the Canadian Charter provides: "The guarantee in this Charter of certain
rights and freedoms shall not be construed as denying the existence of any other rights or
freedoms that exist in Canada." CAN. CONST. pt. 1 § 26.
64. See Roberts, supra note 57, at 835; Rosenn, Judicial Review in Latin America,
supra note 17, at 801. The decision of the Supreme Court of Justice in Siri is discussed in
BIDART CAMPOS,

supra note 58, at 57-70;

LAZZARINI,

supra note 58, at 25-29;

NESTOR PEDRO

SAGOtS, Acc16N DE AMPARO 9-11 (2d ed. 1988); Roberto Repetto, El recurso de Amparo en
la nueva interpretaci6n de la Corte suprema de la naci6n, [1958-I] J.A. 476 (Arg.).
65. Judgment of Sept. 5, 1958, S.R.L. Samuel Kot, CSJN, 241 Fallos 291 (1958), translated in KARST & ROSENN, supra note 16, at 163-65.
66. 241 Fallos 291, translated in KARST & ROSENN, supra note 16 at 163-64.
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After approximately a decade of purely jurisprudential development of the law of amparo-a highly unusual occurrence in a
country of civil law tradition-and following many aborted
projects,67 the federal legislature enacted statutes to regulate the
practice and use of amparo. The most comprehensive piece of legislation on amparo is Law No. 16.986 of October 18, 1966, aimed
primarily at the amparo against acts of a public authority." In addition to answering various procedural questions, Law No. 16.986
declared amparo inapplicable against acts of the judiciary or acts
pursuant to the National Defense Law.6 9 Further, and potentially
more significantly, the law declared that amparo will not lie where
it can lead to a judgment that would "directly or indirectly compromise the regularity, continuity and efficacy of performance of a
public service, or to the development of activities essential to the
state. ' 7 0 A year later the federal legislature adopted a second statute governing amparo against acts of private individuals, Law No.
17.454 of September 20, 1967.71 These statutes did not change
much of the existing law of amparo and can rightly be considered
primarily as a codification of the judicially developed rules regulat72
ing the use of amparo.
2.

General Principles of Amparo

While far from attaining the complexity of its Mexican predecessor, the Argentine law of amparo has given rise to many precise
rules governing its application. For the sake of clarity, these can be
divided into three groups: (i) rules relating to the act giving rise to
the amparo proceedings; (ii) procedural rules; and (iii) rules affecting the decision to be rendered.
67. For a discussion of draft statutes of amparo that were never adopted, see SAGtUS,
supra note 64, at 17-31; Alfredo Orgaz, La legislaci6n sabre amparo, 102 LA LEY [L.L.] 1072
(1961).
68. Law No. 16.986 of Oct. 18, 1966, 1967-A A.L.J.A. 500 (Arg.) translated in KARST &
ROSENN, supra note 16, at 174-76.
69. Id. art. 2(b).
70. Id. art. 2(c). According to Roberts, supra note 57, at 844-45, this provision would in
fact be unconstitutional. This opinion is shared by BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 58, at 274-75
and SAG09S, supra note 64, at 214-29. This exception was in fact interpreted narrowly by
the courts. SAG0US, supra note 64, at 228-29; Patricia B. Barbado, Condiciones de admisibilidad de la acci6n de amparo, [1991-B] L.L. 565 (1991).
71. Law No. 17.454 of Sept. 20, 1967. This statute enacted article 321 of the Code of
Civil and Commercial Procedure, translated in Fix Zamudio, supra note 15, at 372 n.38.
72. GARMAN BIDART CAMPOS, TRATADO ELEMENTAL DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL ARGENTINO, ToMo I: EL DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA LIBERTAD 494 (1986).
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Acts Giving Rise to Amparo

The impugned act may be committed by an individual acting
in a private capacity, a group of such people, or an individual acting in any official capacity pursuant to authority stemming from
any source. 73 The impugned act may be any action, abstention, or
omission leading to the infringement of a constitutional right. Two
exceptions somewhat limit this generality. First, as mentioned
above, acts effected pursuant to the National Defense Law may not
be attacked through amparo.7 4 Second, and more significantly, judicial decisions may not be challenged through amparo. 75 The rationale to this latter rule is ably summarized by Roberts:
A complainant may not institute a separate proceeding seeking
amparo from the decision of a judge which he considers arbitrary. The reasoning behind this prohibition is that to permit a
judge foreign to a cause to overturn the decision of the judge of
another competent court would bring about insecurity and instability in the judicial system. Amparo is not to be invoked as
a substitute for appellate review.7
This does not mean, however, that any final judicial decision will
automatically prevent the use of amparo. Amparo may be used to
77
attack the original act, but not the judicial decision itself. In Kot,
for example, the owner of the occupied factory first applied to a
criminal court to have the striking workers condemned. This was
refused both at trial and on appeal on the ground that the workers
did not intend to keep the premises. The denial of relief was not
construed as an obstacle in the later amparo proceedings. 8 In addition, the prohibition is aimed at judicial decisions, not at acts
performed by the judiciary which are of an administrative rather
79
than a judicial nature.
For amparo to be invoked, the impugned act must trench on a
constitutionally protected right other than the right to physical
73.
74.
75.
76.

See Angel Siri, 239 Fallos 459 (1958); S.R.L. Samuel Kot, 241 Fallos 291 (1958).
Law No. 16.986 art. 2(b); see supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
Law No. 16.986 art. 2(b); see supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
Roberts, supra note 57, at 843 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added); see BIDART
CAMPOS, supra note 58, at 261-64.
77. 241 Fallos 291.
78. BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 58, at 184-86.
79. See BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 72, at 499; SAG0US, supra note 64, at 204-09; Patricia B. Barbado, Actos alcanzadospor la acci6n de amparo, [1991-B] L.L. 592, 601-02 (1991).
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liberty, which is enforceable only through habeas corpus.8 0 Further,
the damage inflicted upon the victim from the act must be serious,
imminent, and irreparable; amparo cannot be used to prevent a
future or merely potential infringement.8 1 This is also expressed as
the need that the damage be real and tangible. In all cases, the
infringement or imminent threat thereof must be present at all
times during the amparo proceedings, including and up to a final
judgment after appeal.82
A special rule applies when the violation takes place in a contractual relationship between the victim and the wrongdoer. In
Rosa Signacore de Galvan v. Manuel Couto,8 3 the Supreme Court
of Justice refused to remedy the violation suffered by the victim
because the case involved the non-fulfillment of a contractual obligation. This broad ruling was later limited and now only prevents
amparo in cases where a party seeks to use it to undo a contract or
to gain an unfair advantage, and not in any case where a contract
is merely present.8 4
The Argentine law of amparo borrowed from the Brazilian
mandado de seguranca the requirement that the illegitimacy, illegality, or arbitrariness of the impugned act must be clear and undisputable without any need for an extensive debate either in law
or in fact. This accords with the summary nature of amparo proceedings. The corollary of this rule is that the applicant's right to
obtain an amparo must be manifest and uncontestable, or that the
application does not require extensive debate on either the law or
the facts.8 5 In certain cases, the Supreme Court of Justice has rec80. Article 1 of Law No. 16.986, supra note 68, translated in KARST & ROSENN, supra
note 16, at 175.
81. VEscovi, supra note 24, at 477.

82. See Judgment of August 10, 1960, Federaci6n Argentina de Trabajores de la Imprenta, CSJN, 247 Fallos 468 (1960) (Arg.); BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 58 at 313-14;
SAG0US, supra note 64, at 106-10; VESCOVI, supra note 24, at 476-77; Barbado, supra note
70, at 588-91.
83. Judgment of May 30, 1960, CSJN, 246 Fallos 380 (1960) (Arg.) translated in KARST
& ROSENN, supra note 16, at 165-66.
84. BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 58, at 270-73. See LAZZARINI, supra note 58, at 170-72;
SAGUS, supra note 64, at 145-47; Barbado, supra note 70, at 593.
85. LAZZARINI, supra note 58, at 164, describes the principle in the following terms:
El agravio que motiva el amparo debe ser ilegitimo, puesto que el mismo puede
producirse en ejercicio de un legitimo derecho, en cuyo caso no ser procedente
La acci6n y, adems, debe ser manifest6, es decir, claro y categ6rico, no discutible o dudoso, pues en este 6ltimo supuesto la cuesti6n tendra que examinarse
por via ordinaria.

Id. (emphasis added).
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ognized the right to amparo despite the absence of a clear and uncontestable right, where the applicant had a simple, legitimate interest in obtaining the delivery of a writ of amparo.6
b.

Procedural Considerations

By nature, amparo is essentially a supplementary procedure,
meaning that any ordinary procedure providing an effective remedy will be preferred to amparo.5 s This has given rise to two distinct rules. First, any existing administrative or judicial procedures, such as ordinary defenses or appeals, must be exhausted
before the wrong will be deemed liquidated (utilisaci6n de las vias
previas). Second, any judicial review applicable, if adequate, will
bar recourse to amparo (utilisaci6n de las vas paralelas o concurrentes)5 s The notion of an "adequate" (id6nea) remedy has been
interpreted to mean that the parallel procedure must provide relief
rapidly enough to avoid any irreparable harm. Ordinary methods
of recourse are often too slow or allow for dilatory maneuvers and,
in such circumstances, will not be considered adequate. 89 Additionally, the courts will not consider a purely illusory recourse as adequate.9 0 On the other hand, inconveniences ordinarily associated
with the use of ordinary procedural means will not suffice to open
the door to an amparo suit."1
Amparo is treated as a summary proceeding because one of its
main objectives is to provide rapid relief. The law of amparo, being
jurisprudentially developed, has no strict set of procedural rules
regulating it. The Supreme Court of Justice has decreed that, as
This character of manifest illegality is reviewed at length in SAGf0ts, supra note 64, at 11035. See Barbado, supra note 70, at 570-75, 584-88.
86. See BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 58, at 317-18. The author cites the example of a
university dean whose office was occupied by students and who obtained an amparo, even
though he was not the beneficiary of the right to education he invoked. Id.
87. This is codified at Article 2(a) of Law No. 16.986, declaring amparo inadmissible
when "[j]udicial or administrative recourses or remedies exist which permit protection of
the constitutional right or guarantee at issue." Law 16.986 art. 2(a), supra note 68 translated in KARST & ROSENN, supra note 16, at 175. See Barbado, supra note 70, at 568-70,
575-81.
88. The sometimes vague difference between the two rules is further explained in
BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 58, at 186-87. See LAZZARINI, supra note 58, at 108, 123.
89. See VESCOVI, supra note 24, at 478-79.
90. Marcelo Sorondo, CSJN, [1968-IV] J.A. 68 (Arg.); see Barbado, supra note 70, at
581-84.
91. Judgment of April 7, 1961, Conrado T. Traverso, CSJN, 249 Fallos 457 (1961)
(Arg.); BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 58, at 193-94.

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:3

the amparo writ is of the same nature as the writ of habeas corpus,
the procedure applicable to the latter should apply to the former
mutatis mutandis.92 Some procedural variations result from the
nature of the order sought through amparo.9 3 The statutes enacted
in 1967 and 1968 dealt with only a few punctual procedural aspects, such as delays and evidence (Articles 6 to 12 of Law 16.986)
and the right to appeal (Article 15), leaving judicial developments
for the most part untouched.
Amparo is an adversarial or bilateral procedure. The individual whose personal constitutional rights have been directly infringed must apply for the writ. If the victim is unable to do so for
any reason, a representative may apply in the victim's place. The
victim may be an artificial or a real person, inasmuch as it enjoys
the constitutional right allegedly violated.9 4 The author of the impugned act is, in turn, given an opportunity to present arguments.
The impossibility of accurately identifying the author of the impugned act will generally not justify refusing relief in amparo,
though cases have indeed denied amparo on that ground.9 5 Finally,
any interested third party may intervene in the proceeding.
All national judges are competent to hear motions and to
grant relief in amparo, provided they have jurisdiction ratione loci
9 s The Supreme Court of Justice has full juand ratione materiae.
risdiction to hear any case in amparo. This jurisdiction is normally
not original, but rather appellate, contrary to the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court of Mexico.
c.

The Amparo Judgment

A final decision in amparo is a hybrid order, part mandamus
and part injunction. 7 Article 2(d) of Law No. 16.986 codified one
of amparo's major limitations, declaring it inapplicable when it
92. See BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 72, at 495; Orgaz, supra note 67, at 1074.
93. See VEscovl, supra note 24, at 483.
94. BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 58, at 319-20.
95. VEscovi, supra, note 24, at 481-82; LAZZARINI, supra note 58, at 276-79. For example
in Siri, Judgment of December 27, 1957, 239 Fallos 459 (1958) (Arg.), the author of the
order to close down the newspaper was unknown, but the Court nevertheless issued an
amparo.
96. Article 4 of Law No. 16.986, supra note 68. Jurisdiction over the subject matter
(ratione materiae) means that national judges will entertain claims against acts of the federal government and state judges will entertain those against the state government. See
BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 72, at 495-96; VESCOVl, supra note 24, at 480-81.
97. See Fix-Zamudio, supra note 27, at 344; Roberts, supra note 57, at 831.
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would require "declaring laws, decrees or ordinances unconstitutional."9 8 The rationale for this rule is that purely declaratory
judgments do not exist in Argentine law and that laws are presumed to conform with the Constitution. Amparo's summary proceedings are not viewed as suited for the debate necessary to rebut
such a presumption. 9 As previously noted, Argentina has an action
in unconstitutionality allowing any court to declare laws invalid,
but, as explained by Bidart Campos, its purpose is to protect the
integrity of the Argentine Constitution, as opposed to amparo
whose aim is to protect individual rights. 100 This perplexing limitation on the courts' power when issuing an amparo judgment seems
to have been adopted directly from Mexican law, where courts are
prevented from making general declarations of unconstitutionality
in the course of an amparo proceeding (under the so-called "Otero
formula").
Argentine law has some exceptions to this prohibition. The
first one concerns manifestly unconstitutional laws. In Carlos J.
Outon,10 1 a few months after the enactment of Law No. 16.986, the
Supreme Court of Justice invalidated a closed-shop decree affecting all maritime workers, holding that:
The admission of this exceptional remedy [amparo] can engender the false belief that any litigious question can be resolved by
this route; or worse yet, that via [amparo] it is possible to obtain
precipitous declarations of unconstitutionality. Hence, the decisions of this Court have established that, in principle,the declaration of unconstitutionality in this type of proceeding is improper ....
Nevertheless, the principle should not be taken as absolute.
Undoubtedly, it will govern the great majority of cases. But
when the provisions of a law, decree, or ordinance clearly result
in violations of any human rights, the existence of a regulation
cannot constitute an obstacle to the immediate reestablishment
. .of the violated fundamental guarantee. Otherwise, an authority could resort to the device of preceding its arbitrary acts
or omissions with a prior norm . . . in order to frustrate the possibility of obtaining immediate restitution of the . . . trampled
*

98.

KARST & ROSENN, supra note 16, at 175.
99. See SAGOUS, supra note 64, at 242-48; Roberts, supra note 57, at 846; Barbado,
supra note 70, at 584-88.
100. BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 58, at 124-27.
101. Judgment of March 29, 1967, Carlos Jos6 Outon y Otros, CSJN, 267 Fallos 215
(1967) (Arg.) translated in KARST & ROSENN, supra note 16, at 179-81.
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right in court.'0 2
Argentine courts were reluctant to follow this decision, but the
Outon approach seems to have prevailed in the last few years.10 3 A
general norm (statute, regulation, or executive order) may also be
declared invalid, although its letter appears to conform to the Constitution, if it is interpreted and applied in a manner that infringes
on fundamental rights.1 0' Finally, any decision rendered in amparo
that declares a general norm unconstitutional is limited to the case
at bar. However, it does carry a measure of stare decisis, so that its
effects are, in fact, quite close to a general declaration of
10 5
unconstitutionality.
Amparo is an emergency procedure aimed at suspending the
effect of an act infringing on the constitutionally protected rights
of a person. Its purpose is not the reparation or indemnification of
any damage incurred by the illegitimate act. Therefore, amparo
suits cannot contain conclusions regarding the monetary redress of
the wrongful act's consequences. Further, amparo cannot be used
as a means to punish the author of the unconstitutional act, since
such punishment is not essential to the suspension of the infringement. Penal or exemplary damages are not compatible with an
amparo suit, as they do not meet the previously-discussed conditions of acceptability of the recourse.10 6 On the other hand, stiff
fines will be levied by the court through contempt proceedings if
the amparo order is not complied with immediately. It must be
said, though, that in Argentina the decisions of the Supreme Court
of Justice are practically always respected by the other two
branches of government.0 7
Finally, as a corollary to this rule, the final decision on an
amparo suit will constitue res judicata only as to the amparo suit
itself. It will not constitute res judicata for any other recourse,
102. 267 Fallos at 218, translated in KARST & ROSENN, supra note 16, at 179-80 (emphasis added).
103. Judgment of May 15, 1984, Arenzon v. Naci6n Argentina, CSJN, 306 Fallos 400
(1984) (Arg.). See Eduardo Oteiza, El juicio de amparo como via idonea para la declaraci6n
de inconstitucionalidad,[1987-II] J.A. 766 (1987) (Arg.).
104. BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 72, at 498.
105. See Alejandro M. Garro, Eficacia y Autoridad del Precedente Constitucional en
America Latina:-Las Lecciones del Derecho Comparado, reprinted in 20 U. MIAMI INTERAM. L. REv. 473, 480-86 (1989); Rosenn, Judicial Review in Latin America, supra note 17, at
790.
106. BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 58, at 434-37.
107. See Rosenn, supra note 17, at 812.
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even if, as in an action for damages, the suit flows from the same
facts and between the same parties. Further, amparo will not constitute res judicata if it is rejected for not meeting one of the conis
ditions requisite for that writ (for example, if a parallel10 recourse
8
available) and another procedure is started thereafter.
The development of amparo in Argentina has not enjoyed the
same overwhelming character as it had in Mexico. The judges who
proceeded to fashion the law of amparo did so by cautious progression, not wanting to destabilize the rest of the Argentine legal system. Amparo in Argentina has remained a much more extraordinary remedy than in Mexico, as demonstrated by the fact that the
Argentine Supreme Court of Justice heard an average of only 26
amparo suits for each year from 1959 to 1969,109 as opposed to several thousand amparo cases decided each year by the Supreme
Court of Mexico.
III.

RELEVANCE OF AMPARO FOR CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

A.

Preliminary Considerations

The institutional and legal context in which the Argentine
amparo developed bears many similarities to that of Canada. The
constitutional law theory of both countries has been strongly influenced by U.S. precedents. Argentina, like Canada, has a federal
system where legislative power over human rights is shared between the provinces and the central government. Both countries
have a federal supreme court with unlimited jurisdiction to entertain claims coming from both the parallel provincial and federal
court systems. In both countries, the judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes can be described as "decentralized," that is,
the power to declare laws unconstitutional is vested in all courts,
not solely in a specifically designated constitutional court.'1 e Although the Argentine Constitution does not have a specific remedial provision like Section 24(1) of the Charter, it does have a distinct habeas corpus provision, similar to Section 10(c) of the
108. See BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 72, at 499; SAG0tS, supra note 64, at 443-52; VEScovi, supra note 24, at 487-88.
109. Rosenn, supra note 17, at 801-02; KARST & ROSENN, supra note 16, at 181-82.
110. The distinction between "centralized" and "decentralized" systems was made by
MAURO CAPELLETTI, JUDIcIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 45-68 (1971). It is applied to Latin America and Argentina in particular, in Rosenn, supra note 17, at 787-88,
where the author points out that a decentralized system is relatively exceptional in Latin
American countries. See VESCOVI, supra note 24, at 402 ("systema difuso").
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Charter.1 1 1 Finally, in creating the amparo in Angel Siri, the Argentine Supreme Court of Justice relied on Article 33 of the Argensimilar in content to Section 26 of
tine Constitution, a provision
12
the Canadian Charter.
Consideration of the Argentine amparo experience can only be
beneficial to the development of the Canadian Charter, which now
barely ten years old, is still in its infancy. The law of amparo in
Argentina is not merely the product of three decades of development in that country, but rather is the result of a long evolution
that started in Mexico in 1848. As such, the Argentine amparo
avoided repeating some of the mistakes committed in other countries, while at the same time, benefitted from the positive aspects
of similar constitutional remedies throughout Latin America.
In light of the purpose and nature of amparo, the review of
Canadian law relating to Section 24 of the Charter will be limited
to cases arising outside a pre-existing judicial context- -situations
where a competent court has not been seized of the contested matter at the time of an application pursuant to Section 24(1) of the
Charter. This particular situation has been the subject of extensive
scholarly discussion and a multitude of judicial decisions, mostly in
the field of criminal law. The most pressing problems in the area of
criminal law involve the powers of the justice of the peace presiding over a preliminary inquiry, and those of the trial judge when
the offense is being tried by a court, other than a Superior Court
.pursuant to Section 96 of the Canadian Constitution Act, 1867."1
In general, courts in criminal matters have responded by directing
that any application pursuant to Section 24 of the Charter must be
presented to the trial judge."14 Finally, as mentioned in the intro111. Section 10(c) of the Charter states that upon arrest or detention everyone has the
right "to have the validity of the detention determined by way of habeas corpus and to be
released if the detention is not lawful." CAN. CONST. pt. 1, art. 10(c).
Article 18 of the Argentine Constitution reads in part: "Nadie puede ser ... arestado
" ARG. CONST. art. 18. Though
sino en virtud de orden escrita de autoridad competente ....
habeas corpus is not mentioned nominally, it was found to stem directly from this article.
BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 72, at 485-90.
112. Both Article 33 of the Argentine Constitution and Section 26 of the Canadian
Charter, see supra note 63, bear the strong influence of the Ninth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.
113. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1867) § 96. Section 96 provides that the federal
government has the power to create "Superior Courts" with exclusive jurisdiction to hear
claims on a vast array of matters. Provincial Courts have a much more limited jurisdiction.
114. Mills v. The Queen, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863 (Can.). See generally PETER W. HOGG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 698-703. (1985); Dale Gibson & Scott Gibson, Enforcement
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS
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duction, this study will focus on the first paragraph of Section 24,
rather than on the exclusion of evidence provision contained in the
second paragraph, which has also been the subject of repeated academic commentaries and extensive analysis by the Supreme Court
of Canada. 1 '
B.

Judicial Interpretation of Section 24(1) of the Charter

Section 24(1) of the Charter was at its inception a new kind of
provision in Canadian constitutional law. For ease of reference,
Section 24(1) is reproduced here again:
Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter,
have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers
appropriate and just in the circumstances.
Canadian judges and lawyers were more familiar with the terms of
a provision such as Section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982,
which declared the supremacy of the constitution and the inoperability of inconsistent laws, since similar provisions had existed for
many years prior to the inception of the new constitution in
1982.116 In the first decision to examine in depth Section 24(1) of
AND FREEDOMS

ch.19 (Edward Ratushny & G~rald-A. Beaudoin eds., 2d ed. 1989); Pierre

B6liveau, L'octroi d'une reparation en vertu de l'article 24 de la Charte des droits et
libert~s, 67 CAN.BAR REV. 622 (1988); Michael Code, American Cadillacs or CanadianCompacts: What Is the Correct Criminal Procedurefor S.24 Applications Under the Charter of
Rights, 33 CRIM. L.Q. 298 (1990-991); Alan D. Gold, Charter-"Courtof Competent Juris-

diction", 26 CRIM. L.Q. 440 (1985-86); McLellan & Elman, supra note 8, at 225-50; Kent
Roach, Section 24(1) of the Charter: Strategy and Structure, 29 CRIM. L.Q. 222 (1986-87); J.
Sandy Tse, CharterRemedies: ProceduralIssues, 69 CRIM. REP. (3d) 129 (1989).

115. R. v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (Can.); R. v. Clarkson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 383
(Can.); R. v. Duguay, Murphy and Sevigny, [1985] 18 DOMINION LAW REPORTS [D.L.R.] (4th)
32, aff'd [1989] 1 S.C.R. 93 (Can.); see generally Ken Chasse, Charter Exclusion-Causation,Nexus and Disrepute, 21 CAN.RIGHTS REP. [C.R.R.] 227 (1986); Kenneth
Jull, Exclusion of Evidence and the Beast of Burden, 30 CRIM. L.Q. 178 (1987-88); ClaudeAndr6 Lachance, L'exclusion de la preuve ill~galement obtenue et la Charte, 62 CAN. BAR
REV. 278 (1984); Gerard E. Mitchell, The Supreme Court of Canada on the Exclusion of
Evidence in Criminal Cases Under Section 24 of the Charter, 30 CRIM. L.Q. 165 (1988);
Andr6 Morel, Le droit d'obtenir une rtparationen cas de violation de droits constitutionels, 18 REVUE JURIDIQUE TH9MIS [R.J.T.] 253 (1984); Michel Proulx, Red~finir les rapports
de force au proc~s criminel: L'effet de la r~gle d'exclusion de l'article 24(2) de la Charte
canadienne des droits et libertts, 20 R.J.T. 109 (1986).
116. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) § 52(1). Section 52(1) provides: "The Consti-

tution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the
provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect." Id.

Similar provisions existed in the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, 28 & 29 Vict., ch. 63
(Eng.), and the Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22 Geo. 5, ch. 4 (Eng.). See Operation Dis-
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the Charter, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the nature of
Section 24(1) as a substantive right rather than a mere procedural
enforcement provision: "Section 24(1) establishes the right to a
remedy as the foundation stone for the effective enforcement of
Charter rights."1'17 As interpreted, the nature of Section 24(1) is
similar to that of amparo." 8 This being said, there has been vast
disagreement as to the effect of Section 24(1) on Canadian law and
institutions. The relevant jurisprudence of the Supreme Court falls
in two stages: first, the landmark decision in Mills, and second, the
ensuing judgments.
1.

R. v. Mills: Initial Treatment of Section 24(1)

The decision in Mills has already been the object of many academic commentaries. This article, however, offers an analysis from
a particular procedural perspective. In Mills, the accused brought
a motion pursuant to Section 24(1) at the preliminary inquiry of a
robbery charge, alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed, contrary to Section 11(b) of the Charter." 9 There ensued a debate as to whether the justice of the peace
presiding over that preliminary inquiry was a "court of competent
jurisdiction" entitled to grant relief under Section 24(1). The Supreme Court split, with Justice McIntyre writing for the majority
which held that the justice of the peace did not have jurisdiction,
while Justice Lamer dissented. 120 Justice La Forest wrote the decisive concurring opinion, agreeing with portions of the dissent, but
ultimately siding with the majority.
The purpose of the present study is to examine the procedural
aspects of an application made pursuant to Section 24(1) in a situmantle v. R., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, 482 (Can.).
117. Mills, [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 881 (Lamer J., dissenting). The principle was later reaffirmed by justice Lamer, for the majority that time, in Nelles v. Ontario:
The question arises then, whether s. 24(1) of the Charterconfers a right to an
individual to seek a remedy from a competent court. In my view it does. When
a person can demonstrate that one of his Charter rights has been infringed, access to a court of competent jurisdiction to seek a remedy is essential for the
vindication of a constitutional wrong.
[1989] 2 S.C.R. 170, 196 (Can.) (emphasis added).
118. Compare BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 58, at 338-39 with Charter, section 24(1).
119. Section 11(b) Charter states that "[any person charged with an offense has the
right . . .to be tried within a reasonable time."
120. Mills, [1986] 1. S.C.R. at 867. Justice Wilson disagreed with Justice Lamer with
respect to the application of section 11(b) while accepting in toto his exposition on section
24(1). Id. at 869.
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ation where no court has previously been seized of the matter.
Hence, problems such as the continuity of the criminal trial and
the right to interlocutory appeal in criminal matters, which were
dealt with extensively by the Court in Mills, will not be addressed
here. Still, general statements of principle provided by the Supreme Court in that case are of some guidance to the topic of this
article.
a.

Availability and Jurisdiction

While the members of the Court in Mills agreed on questions
of the availability of a Section 24(1) remedy and on some considerations of jurisdiction, they fundamentally disagreed as to the
proper procedural vehicle to be used when applying that provision.
Availability and jurisdiction are two elements naturally intertwined, such that the question of availability can also be expressed
in jurisdictional terms. In an early application of the Charter, the
Quebec Court of Appeal held that a journalist cited for ex facie
contempt of court could not appeal the trial judge's refusal to
grant him a jury trial, although the right to a jury trial is entrenched in Section 11(f) of the Charter.12 ' The Court of Appeal
refused to hear the application on the merits, even though this refusal deprived the accused of his right to a jury trial. In a concurring opinion, Justice Kaufman explained:
It may well be, as the applicant argues, that if, in the circumstances, this court does not consider itself a "court of competent jurisdiction",no other court is competent either, and, in
effect, there may be a right without a remedy-a thought repugnant to the law. But that is a matter for the legislator, and
even if we were prepared to "innovate," the stark fact remains
that, as a statutory tribunal, we are only possessed of those powers which are conferred on us by statute, and that does not include the supervision, save by way of appeal, of the Superior
12 2
Court and its judges.
121. Re Laurendeau and the Queen, [1984] 4 Dominion Law Reports [D.L.R.] (4th) 702
(Can.). Section 11(f) of the Charter reads:
Any person charged with an offence has the right ... except in the case of an
offence under military law tried before a military tribunal, to the benefit of trial
by jury where the maximum punishment for the offense is imprisonment for five
years or a more severe punishment.
Charter, § 11(f).
122. Re Laurendeau and the Queen, [1984] 4 D.L.R. (4th) at 708 (emphasis added).
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This approach to Section 24(1) throws us back to the Canadian
Bill of Rights impasse found in Hogan v. The Queen,12 even
though Section 24(1) was precisely aimed at preventing such a dilemma. 1 24 In Mills, both Justice Lamer and Justice La Forest explicitly stated that, since Section 24(1) is a substantive provision
conferring a constitutional right, there must always be an available
court capable of granting relief under that section.12 5 As Justice
Lamer explained:
A corollary which flows from [the right to obtain a just and appropriate remedy] is the fundamental principle that there must
always be a court available to grant, not only a remedy, but the
remedy which 26is the appropriate and just one under the
circumstances.1
Likewise, Justice La Forest stated that "[tihere must . . . at all
times be a court of competent jurisdiction to whom resort can be
had when an accused believes his constitutional right to be tried
within a reasonable time has been breached."' 7 This principle has
been repeated insistently by the Supreme Court of Canada in a
number of cases following Mills. 2 8
The necessary existence of a court competent to grant relief
under Section 24(1) leads naturally to the development of guiding
principles allowing litigants to choose the court in which they present such applications. There had been, before the Supreme
Court's decision in Mills, a doctrinal debate as to the jurisdictional
requirements of a "court of competent jurisdiction." Most writers
and the early case law agreed that a competent court needed to
have jurisdiction over the subject matter (ratione materiae) and
the person (rationepersonae). There was, however, a disagreement
as to whether the court should have a pre-existing power to grant
the order sought pursuant to Section 24(1), or if, on the contrary,
the court could expand its jurisdiction to add to its powers in that
regard.2 The Supreme Court in Mills ended the debate by unani123. [1975] 2 S.C.R. 574 (Can.).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 5-8.
125. Mills, [19861 1 S.C.R. at 882 (Lamer J., dissenting), and 976 (La Forest, J.
concurring).
126. Id. at 882 (Lamer J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 976 (La Forest J., concurring) (emphasis added).
128. See, e.g., Nelles v. Ontario, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170, 195-96 (Can.); R. v. Gamble,
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 595, 633-34 (Can.); R. v. Rahey, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588, 630 (Can.).
129. See HOGo, supra note 114, at 695-97; H. Patrick Glenn, L'article 24(1) de la
Charte canadienne des droits et libert~s: La reparationjuste et convenable, in FONDATION
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mously agreeing with the former interpretation, which required the
court to have initial competence over the remedy. 3 0
Finally, both the minority and the majority in Mills agreed on
a very general level that "the Charter was not enacted in a vacuum' 131 and therefore that existing procedures should not be ignored. The precise significance of such a statement, however, gave
rise to widely differing interpretations amongst the justices of the
Supreme Court.
b.

Procedural Considerations

Mills embodies the fundamental conflict between two competing views of the impact of Section 24(1) and, more generally, of the
Charter as a whole. Justice Lamer was prepared to give much
greater significance to the inception of the Charter than was Justice McIntyre, who appeared to view the Charter as an addition to,
rather than transformation of, Canadian Law.
For Justice McIntyre, Section 24(1) does not attribute new jurisdiction to any court. Courts must therefore attempt to integrate
an application made pursuant to that provision into the existing
procedural framework. As Justice McIntyre explained:
To begin with, it must be recognized that the jurisdiction of the
various courts of Canada is fixed by the Legislatures of the various provinces and by the Parliament of Canada. It is not for the
judge to assign jurisdiction in respect of any matters to one
court or another. This is wholly beyond the judicial reach ....
The task of the court will simply be to fit the application into
the existing jurisdictional scheme of the courts in an effort to
provide a direct remedy, as contemplated in s. 24(1). It is important, in my view, that this be borne in mind. The absence of
jurisdictionalprovisions and directions in the Charter confirms
the view that the Charter was not intended to turn the Canadian legal system upside down. What is required rather is that
PERMANENTE DU BARREAU DU QUtBEC, APPLICATION DES CHARTES DES DRorrs ET LIBERTtS EN

MATItRE CIVILE 75,

80-82 (1988); J.C. Levy, The Invocation of Remedies Under the Charter

of Rights and Freedoms: Some Procedural Considerations, 13 MANITOBA L.J. 523, 537-39
(1983); Marilyn Pilkington, Monetary Redress for Charter Infringement, in CHARTER LITIGATION 307, 323 (Robert J. Sharpe ed., 1987); Jeffrey Sack et al., Where to Go and How to
Get There: Questions of Forum and Form in Charter Litigation, in CHARTER CASES 143,

152-54 (Grald-A. Beaudoin ed., 1987).
130. [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 883, 955.
131. This sentence can be found in both Justice Lamer's dissenting opinion and Justice
McIntyre's majority opinion. Id. at 882, 956.
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it be fitted into the existing scheme of Canadian legal procedure. There is no need for special procedures and r'ules to give
it full and adequate effect.132
Thus the rules must be bent, but not disregarded, to accommodate
the courts' new duty under the Charter. This should be done,
wrote Justice McIntyre, with existing procedural vehicles, such as
the right to appeal and the prerogative writs. At the same time,
however, he denied that the Charter may have created new rights
to appeal or that an infringement of constitutionally guaranteed
rights by an administrative body would imply that it exceeded its
jurisdiction. 3 Considering the limited scope of the statutory right
to appeal and the patchwork of privative clauses protecting the decisions of administrative bodies, except those involving an excess
of jurisdiction, 3 the question of how an effective remedy may be
granted while respecting the principles laid down by Justice McIntyre becomes difficult to answer. Indeed, one may get the impression from a discussion later in the opinion that Justice McIntyre
considers Section 24(1) to grant the right to have a well-founded
complaint remedied, but not to have one's alleged complaint verified."3 ' Justice McIntyre's views seem to be deeply influenced by
the particular context of criminal pre-trial procedure which may
bring the prosecution to a definite halt after a summary procedure,
and should not be extended to cover all situations where a claim
may arise pursuant to 24(1) of the Charter.
Justice Lamer took a different approach. He viewed the Charter as a fundamental innovation in Canadian law, even as applied
to procedural matters. For him, it would be vain to hope that the
integration of the new Charter remedies could be accomplished
simply. Rather, one should expect that, up to a point, complica132. Id. at 952-53 (emphasis added).
133. Id. at 958-60 (no right to appeal), 964-65 (no jurisdictional error).
134. See infra text accompanying notes 175-78 and 191-93.
135. Justice McIntyre wrote:
It is argued that these applications [under section 24(1)] deal with fundamental
rights and freedoms and accordingly should have priority. This argument rests,
in my view, on two fallacies. The first is the assumption implicit in the argument that the claimant is entitled to a remedy. The second is that allowing an
interlocutory appeal will get a remedy for him more quickly than the ordinary
process of the court.
It must be remembered that everyone who claims Charter relief will not
necessarily get what he seeks. There will be successful claims and unsuccessful
claims, and in respect of each claim the question of breach of the right and entitlement to relief will have to be dealt with.
[1986] 1 S.C.R. at 963 (emphasis added).
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tions of the legal system will ensue. Legislatures may very well
want to enact statutes to regulate this new procedure, but in the
meantime, procedural roadblocks must not stand in the way of effective enforcement of the Charter.13' Justice Lamer agreed with
Justice McIntyre's opinion that the Charter does not usually create
a new right to appeal and that an act impinging on Charter rights
will not necessarily constitute a jurisdictional error. 3 " For Justice
Lamer however, Section 24(1) introduced a sui generis remedy,
distinct from appeal or prerogative writs by virtue of "the unique
character of a constitutional remedy."1 38 This remedy has no other
basis than Section 24(1) itself. When the impugned act is a bona
fide jurisdictional error, a prerogative writ and a Charter remedy
may be used. If both are used, the writ is subsumed into the Charter remedy, so that the aggregate of remedies becomes available
through a single procedure. 3 9 Thus,
[R]egardless of whether the superior court is exercising its jurisdiction on a s. 24(1) application or on a prerogative writ application, and whether it is in the same, or in distinct proceedings,
when the allegations are of a violation that vitiates the court's
jurisdiction, as is the case for a violation of s. 11(b), it should act
as if both routes had been taken and deal with both aspects at
the same time. This simplified procedure will provide access to
a full panoply of available remedies within the one hearing,
thereby saving time and expense.'"
The expansion of existing powers through this Charter remedy will
not be without limitations. Justice Lamer drew an impenetrable
border between powers belonging to courts of criminal jurisdiction
and those of courts of civil jurisdiction."'
Justice La Forest agreed with Justice McIntyre's conclusion
that the magistrate presiding over the preliminary inquiry was not
a court of competent jurisdiction under Section 24(1) of the Charter. Of the more general principles applicable to that provision,
Justice La Forest's position appears ambivalently drawn from the
reasoning of both Justice Lamer and Justice McIntyre. While rejecting the need for a parallel Charter remedy, Justice La Forest
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

898-99, 905 (Lamer J., dissenting).
897, 899-901 (Lamer J., dissenting).
893 (Lamer J., dissenting).
897-99, 901-02 (Lamer J., dissenting).
898-99 (Lamer J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
884-90 (Lamer J., dissenting).
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acknowledged that situations may arise requiring the creation of
innovative remedies, but he failed to detail the procedure to be
14 2
followed in such cases.
The Supreme Court's very cautious approach in Mills left Canadian law, with respect to the procedural aspects of Section 24(1)
of the Charter, in a state of uncertainty, leading some commentators to take a dyspeptic view of the substantive future of the
1 43
provision.
2.

Subsequent Interpretations of Section 24(1) of the Charter

The ensuing decisions of the Supreme Court on the meaning
to be accorded to Section 24(1) of the Charter lessened the uncertainty but failed to clearly articulate the standards applicable to
that provision. While Section 24(1) was invoked by litigants in a
great many cases, it was more thoroughly discussed in two Su4
preme Court decisions: R. v. Rahey 144 and R. v. Gamble. 1
a.

R. v. Rahey

In R. v. Rahey, decided only one year after Mills, the Supreme
Court was once again faced with an application under Section
24(1) alleging that the accused's constitutional right to a trial
within a reasonable time had been denied (art. 11(b) of the Charter). 14' The Court split on all sides. 1 47 Of particular interest for our
present purpose is Justice Wilson's discussion of Section 24(1).
142. Justice La Forest stated:
It should be obvious from the foregoing remarks that I am sympathetic to
the view that Charter remedies should, in general, be accorded within the normal procedural context in which an issue arises. I do not believe s. 24 of the
Charterrequires the wholesale invention of a parallel system for the administration of Charter rights over and above the machinery already available for
the administrationof justice.
Nonetheless, it is the Charterthat governs, and if the ordinaryprocedures
fail to meet the requirements of the Charterfully, then a means must be found
to give it life.
Id. at 971-72 (La Forest J., concurring) (emphasis added).
143. See Raynold Langlois, A la defense de l'article 24, in VUES CANADIENNES ET
EUROPI.ENES DES DROITS ET LIBERTikS 246-47 (Gerald-A. Beaudoin ed., 1989).
144. [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588 (Can.).
145. [1988] 2 S.C.R. 595 (Can.).
146. [1987] 1 S.R.C. 588 (Can.).
147. Id. Justice Chouinard did not participate in the decision, and the eight remaining
justices formed four groups of two, none of whom dissented.
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Justice Wilson submitted that courts presented with a claim based
on Section 24(1) should strive to tailor the remedy to the infringement of the constitutional right. The extent of the judge's discretion to forge a remedy which is "just and appropriate in the circumstances" was set out as follows:
What is an appropriate remedy for the violation of one right
may not be appropriate for the violation of another. Accordingly, s. 24(1) is necessarily expressed so as to confer on a court
of competent jurisdiction a broad discretion as to remedies. The
remedy or remedies, as the case may be, must be tailored to the
particularright which has been violated. This does not mean,
however, that all remedies are available for the violation of all
rights. For the violation of some rights only one remedy may be
available. For the violation of others a choice of remedies may
be available.4"

Wilson concluded that, in the case of a violation of the right to a
speedy trial, the sole remedy available was to quash the indictment. Further, Justice Wilson insisted that the court's discretion
does not extend further than the nature of the remedy and certainly does not cover the existence of the violation (a question of
law), or the very right to a remedy."4 9 She noted that "it is rights
that are guaranteed under the Charter, not remedies." 150 One
should not take this to mean that there is no right to have Charter
rights enforced through a remedy, since this is, of course, the very
substantive right entrenched in Section 24(1), but rather that no
entitlement to a specific remedy exists, since the choice of remedy
falls within the judge's discretion under Section 24(1). These are
fundamental principles stemming not only from the wording of
Section 24(1) of the Charter, but also from the general purpose of
that provision-to ensure that any person whose constitutional
rights have been violated has a right to redress through an effective remedy.
Justice La Forest wrote the other opinion in Rahey which discussed the substance of Section 24(1) at some length. He took an
approach somewhat similar to that of Justice Wilson, but insisted
on the flexibility of the process set out in Section 24(1). He rejects
148. Id. at 619-20 (Wilson J.) (emphasis added).
149. Id. at 620. Justice Wilson explained: "I do not doubt that more than one remedy
may be available for the violation of some rights but the discretion of the court is confined
to the remedy." Id.
150. Id. at 621.
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the notion that there can be only one appropriate and just remedy
for the denial of the right to a speedy trial, arguing instead that
the remedy must suit the particular circumstances of the case."'
Noting that the accused had been criticized for not having taken a
writ of mandamus when he believed that he was being denied his
constitutional right to a speedy trial, Justice La Forest found that
this had no impact whatsoever on the accused's right under Section 24(1):
In general, there is no reason why an accused should be barred
from appropriate constitutional relief by the existence of a prerogative writ. Mandamus is by definition a limited remedy, and
therefore too narrow a recourse for a person who believes that
his Charter rights have been infringed and that he is accordingly entitled to the full range of remedies provided by s. 24(1).
Furthermore if, as I have indicated, the accused's rights had arguably been infringed to such a degree that they could only be
remedied by dismissal of the charges, mandamus would not only
be an overly narrow remedy, but an inappropriate one.'
Given the fact that Justice La Forest had rejected the necessity to
create a "parallel system for the administration of Charterrights"
in Mills, 5 3 his opinion in Rahey constitutes a clear progression towards the idea that Section 24(1) of the Charter requires its own
procedural vehicle. According to the above passage by Justice La
Forest, and consistent with Justice Lamer's opinion in Mills,'
such a procedural vehicle would encompass all pre-existing remedies available through prerogative writs.
b.

R. v. Gamble

In R. v. Gamble, 55 the applicant presented a motion pursuant
to Section 24(1) of the Charter, in addition to writs of certiorari
and habeas corpus. She alleged that because she would not be eligible for parole for twenty-five years, she had been deprived of her
right to liberty in contravention of the principles of fundamental
justice and Section 7 of the Charter.15 6 The majority of the Court
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
curity of

Id. at 638-39, 648 (La Forest J.).
Id. at 631 (emphasis added).
Mills, [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 971.
Id. at 898-99 (Lamer J., dissenting).
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 595 (Can.).
Section 7 of the Charter provides: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and sethe person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the
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found in favor of the applicant. A dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Dickson focused on the question of retrospective application of
Section 7 of the Charter, thus avoiding considerations related to
Section 24(1). Writing for the majority, Justice Wilson furthered
the principles she had laid down in Rahey and stated that courts
should adopt a purposive approach when applying Section 24(1) of
the Charter. 5 " After acknowledging Justice La Forest's statement
in Mills relating to the absence of a "parallel system," she insisted
on the need for procedural flexibility under Section 24(1) and emphasized that an application pursuant to that provision should remain unaffected by limitations particular to a writ which may be
joined thereto. 5 8 Justice Wilson then adopted the procedural principles set out by Justice Lamer in Mills.'5 9 She also quoted and
adopted the following passage from a decision of the Ontario High
Court:
Having held above that this court is a "court of competent jurisdiction" with respect to this application and being confronted,
in this application, by an assertion that a corporate accused's
right, guaranteed by the Charter, had been or was about to be
denied, am I to apply the ordinary rules as to the circumstances
in which certiorari will lie in respect of a preliminary enquiry?
In my view, the situation is quite different where a Charter
remedy is invoked. The application could have been brought
expressly pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter without any reference to certiorari or to prohibition as such. It is convenient in
situations like these for the applications to be made and discussed, and for orders to be made, in the terms and language of
the traditional remedies and means of review, but a right of application conferred by s. 24(1) of the Charter is not to be cut
down by limitations placed upon the exercise of discretionary
60
powers or prerogative remedies in non-Charter situations.
The approach by the Canadian Supreme Court in Gamble clearly
principles of fundamental justice."
157. The Supreme Court of Canada has adopted a purposive approach to interpreting
the Charter of Rights generally. Under a purposive or teleological approach, the purpose of
the provisions serve as a guide in the delineation of the rights entrenched. A purposive
approach is to be differentiated from a textual approach, whereby the wording of the provisions is the sole guide to the content of the rights, and from an original intent approach,
whereby rights protected are those so intended by the drafters.
158. [1988] 2 S.C.R. 595, 635, 638 & 640.
159. [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 894-905 (Lamer J., dissenting).
160. Re Arrigo and the Queen, 29 Can. Crim. Cases (3d) 77, 84 (1986) (emphasis
added). This opinion was rendered three weeks before the Supreme Court's decision in Mills
was made public.
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curtails the generality of Justice La Forest's rejection in Mills of
the need to create an independent remedy pursuant to Section
24(1) of the Charter.
Although it has touched on questions relating to applications
pursuant to Section 24(1) of the Charter, the Supreme Court of
Canada has not, since its 1988 decision in Gamble, discussed the
existence of a Charter application distinct from any other procedure. The state of Canadian law with respect to Section 24(1) of
the Charter, with its vague procedural principles, provides insufficient guidance to lower courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction
under the provision. The Supreme Court's treatment of Section
24(1) appears to be still evolving, and the examined cases would
therefore represent only a transitional period in the slow and difficult integration of Section 24(1) into the Canadian legal system.
The hesitancy of Canadian courts to affirm that this provision enlarges their jurisdiction probably indicates that they would prefer
to share the Charter's impact with the legislative branch of government. But the hopes that the legislature would enact a statutory
scheme to accommodate applications pursuant to Section 24(1)
have remained unanswered, so that courts are still left on their
own to delineate the procedural rules applicable to such
applications.
C.
24(1)

The Need for FurtherDevelopment of the Law of Section

The procedural aspect of Section 24(1) stands now as a hybrid
proceeding, consisting of half-ordinary or extraordinary remedy
(e.g. appeal, defense, or injunction, mandamus) and half-sui
generis Charter remedy. This is inadequate for two reasons: First,
it underlines a trend toward distorting non-Charter remedies, and
second, it allows the shortcomings of both ordinary and extraordinary remedies to be introduced in the context of Section 24(1) of
the Charter.
1. General Trend
There is considerable debate among scholars as to whether the
pre-Charter ordinary and extraordinary remedies can adequately
ensure the full and effective enforcement of a constitutional right,
without requiring the creation of a so-called "parallel route." Certain academics answer in the affirmative and deny the existence of
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a "Charter writ" stemming directly from Section 24(l)."I This position conforms with the narrow view of Section 24(1) adopted by
Justices McIntyre and La Forest in Mills that the Charter creates
no new remedies and that applications pursuant to Section 24(1)
must follow existing procedures."' The proponents of this position
agree that it entails the necessary adaptation of prerogative writs
and ordinary remedies to permit innovative uses that meet the
3 In fact, this adaptation
particular requirements of the Charter.
requirement also appears in Justice Lamer's approach in Mills,
which was later adopted by the majority in Gamble,'" even though
Justice Lamer views Section 24(1) as creating a distinguishable
remedy. Justice Lamer sees both writ and Charter remedies as coalescing into an indistinguishable procedure, even when one or the
other has not been invoked specifically, so that the writ may acquire qualities properly belonging to the Charter remedy and vice
versa. Both approaches adopted by the majority and the dissent in
Mills lead, it would seem, to the danger warned of by Justice
Lamer:
We should not distort our prerogative writs, which have been
developed in Canadianlaw and procedure over time, to become
ipso facto instruments of review under the Charter.The use of
such an expanded notion of jurisdictional error would unneces165
sarily alter the prerogative writ process beyond recognition.
Despite this warning, the courts seem to have given little thought
to the distorting effect that this transformation would have on
both ordinary and extraordinary remedies.
Two equally unattractive long-term repercussions may result
from an approach striving to adapt pre-Charter remedies to meet
Charter requirements. The first possibility is that the law of remedies evolving after the Charter will radically depart from pre-Charter law. New remedial principles developed to meet the Charter's
requirements will alter the law of remedies as a whole, and thereafter be applied in non-Charter contexts. In view of the extreme caution shown by the Supreme Court of Canada in applying the Charter's remedial provisions, it is highly doubtful that the high court
161. See Gibson & Gibson, supra note 114, at 540; 4 RENt DUSSAULT & Louis
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

BORGEAT,

410 (1990).

162. [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 950-53, 971-72.
163. Gamble, [1988] 2 S.C.R. at 640; see DUSSAULT & BORGEAT supra note 161, at 410.
164. [1988] 2 S.C.R. at 640-41.
165. [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 897 (Lamer J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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would consider this a desirable effect. Such an approach would introduce into Canadian administrative law modifications that are
foreign to that body of law.
The second possible result of the "adaptation" approach is
that, on the contrary, there will be no confusion between principles
developed under the Charter as to writs and other remedies, but
that these special Charter rules will apply only to an alleged violation of a constitutional right. Aside from being unlikely, such compartmentalization of writs depending on the nature of the underlying right would in fact be no better than the first scenario
primarily because complication of both administrative and constitutional law would ensue. There would be rules for "mandamus"
and rules for "Charter mandamus," and so forth, for all ordinary
and extraordinary remedies.16 6 The task of distinguishing which
rule belongs to which mandamus, for example, would prove to be
complicated, if not extremely difficult. Further, a litigant who believes that one of his or her Charter rights has been violated would
have to choose carefully between a "Charter mandamus" and a
"Charter injunction," and so on, since the denial of the existence
of a single remedy inevitably implies differences in the purpose
and effect of the multiple remedies available under Section 24(1).
We are, with either of these scenarios, quite far' indeed from
the wish expressed by the Supreme Court of Canada that the enforcement of Charter rights through Section 24(1) be achieved
through a "simplified procedure' ' 1 67 allowing the applicant a "reasonable measure of flexibility" in framing a claim. 6 ' In fashioning
the law of Section 24(1), courts should bear in mind the advice
given by Justice Lamer in Mills:
The rights guaranteed under the Charter are varied. As a result,
their enforcement will, to some extent, be similarly varied. In
determining from which court remedies may be sought and the
procedure to be followed we should strive to achieve uniformity
but must accept that there will, of necessity, be some variation,
if not always as a matter of law, at least in practice.' 69
After nearly a decade of Charter application, Justice Lamer's ad166. Indeed, Hogg, in the latest edition of his book on Crown liability, has special subheadings entitled "Constitutional Injunction" and "Constitutional Mandamus." PETER W.
HOGG, LIABILITY OF THE CROWN 26, 34-35 (2d ed. 1989).
167. Mills, [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 899 (Lamer J., dissenting).
168. Gamble, [1988] 2 S.C.R. at 638.
169. [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 883 (emphasis added).
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vice must be taken to heart; uniformity should be one of the guiding factors in the development of Charter remedies. As he points
out, differences are inevitable, but they should be kept to a minimum. Such differences should arise, not from purely procedural
considerations stemming from the use of pre-Charter remedies, but
from the varying nature of substantive rights enforced through
Section 24(1) of the Charter. There already exist various movements in administrative law to simplify the law of writs and ordinary remedies, 170 but the comment of Professors P6pin and Ouellette about judicial review remains sadly true in most Canadian
provinces and at the federal level:
Malheureusement, la multiplicit6 de ces modes d'exercice est
une source de difficult~s tant pour l'administr6 que pour son
avocat; l'exercice de pouvoir de surveillance donne lieu trop
souvent & de complexes d~bats qui se situent au seul niveau de
leur recevabilit6; l'administr6 intress6 peut voir son recours
rejet6 uniquement parce qu'il n'a pas utilis le recours apLa complexproprie pour solliciter l'intervention du juge....
itk des proc~d~s de mise en oeuvre du pouvoir de surveillance
que les
att6nue, de beaucoup, les vertus du contr6le judiciaire
7
tribunaux exercent sur l'activitk administrative.1 1
Insisting on dressing an application under Section 24(1) of the
Charter in the cloak of a pre-Charter remedy will not only bring
into constitutional law the problems described by P~pin and Ouellette but also perpetuate anachronistic distinctions among the various remedies.17 2 The utilization of a unique, all-encompassing
170. Statutes have been enacted in Australia (Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act (1977)); British Colombia (Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.B.C. (1979) ch.
209); England (Rules of the Supreme Court, Order 53, as amend.); New Zealand (Judicial
Amendment Act, 1972); and Ontario (Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. (1980) ch. 224
(Can.); Statutory Powers Procedures Procedure Act, R.S.O. (1980) ch. 484 (Can.). In England, for example, since 1978 a unique procedure allows the invocation of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, injunction and declaratory action. J.L. Lambert, Reform of the Public Law
Remedies in England, 56 CAN. BAR REV. 668 (1978).
171. GILLES PfPIN & YVES OUELLETTE, PRINCIPES DE CONTENTIEUX ADMINISTRATIF 293-94
(1982)(emphasis added) ("Unfortunately, the great number of procedural vehicles creates
difficulties for both the individuals and their lawyers; too often, judicial review proceedings
lead to debates exclusively centered on whether the matter was properly brought to the
court's attention; in fact, the individual's claim may be rejected for the sole reason that an
inadequate procedure was used to bring it to the court's attention . . . . The complexity of
judicial review proceedings greatly lessens the value of judicial control of administrative
action."); see also DUSSAULT & BORGEAT, supra note 161, at 410-11; DAVID JONES & ANN DE
VILLARS, PRINCIPLES oF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 401-11 (1985).
172. In fact, the stated purpose of statutory amendments that simplify administrative
law remedies seems eminently suitable to the judicial development of section 24(1) of the
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Charter application, on the other hand, would constitute a purposive approach to Charter remedies, similar to the
one adopted by
173
the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Gamble.
2.

Inadequacy of Pre-Charter Remedies

While it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine all the
possible shortcomings of ordinary and extraordinary remedies as
applied to Section 24(l) of the Charter, a quick review of the most
striking inadequacies is appropriate to complete the argument developed above and fully illustrate the necessity of a single Charter
application.
a.

Crown Immunity

The first and foremost difficulty raised by prerogative writs
and ordinary remedies, and especially injunctions, is their unavailability against the Crown. The general common law rule is that the
Crown is immune from the application of both ordinary laws and
many ordinary and extraordinary remedies. 7 4 Statutes enacted
before the inception of the Charter have largely left intact the
Crown's immunity to many extraordinary remedies. 175 The resultCharter:
Instead of forms of application to compel, prohibit or set aside the exercise of
statutory powers, there should be a single application to the courts in which all
the relief obtainable under any of the existing remedies would be available, without the technical complexities, provoking much legalistic debate, which often obstruct, delay and sometimes defeat a decision on the merits.
Explanatory note accompanying the Ontario Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. Ch. 224
(1980) (Can.), cited in PAPIN & OUELLETTE, supra note 171, at 297.
173. [1988] 2 S.C.R. at 642.
174. See Centre d'information et d'animation communautaire v. R., [19841 2 F.C. 866
(Fed. C.A.)(Can.); Grand Council of the Crees (Quebec) v. R., [1982] 1 F.C. 599 (Fed. C.A.)

(Can.).
Section 17 of the Canada Interpretation Act, R.S.C. ch. 1-21 (1985) (Can.), codifies a
formulation of that rule: "No enactment is binding on Her Majesty or affects Her Majesty
or Her Majesty's rights or prerogative in any manner, except as mentioned or referred to in
the enactment."
See also DUSSAULT & BORGEAT, supra note 161, at 442; JoNEs & DE VILLARS, supra note
171, at 393-94; BARRY L. STRAYER, THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS 117-21 (3d
ed. 1988); David Sgayias, Enforcing the Charter: Civil Remedies 55-58 (Dep't of Justice of
Canada, Ottawa, November 1990) (on file with the University of Miami Inter-American
Law Review).
175. There are statutes in every Canadian province prohibiting injunctions and specific
performance against the Crown. See ROBERT J. SHARPE, INJUNCTIONS AND SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

172-73 (1983);

STRAYER,

supra note 174, at 121-26.
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ing problem is obvious given that, as Canadian law now stands, the
76 In the case of injuncCharter applies only against the Crown.
tions, it has been admitted that a Crown servant will be amenable
77
to injunctive relief if the impugned act was ultra vires.1 However,
as already seen, the Supreme Court of Canada in Mills rejected the
idea that any act trenching on a constitutionally protected right
will necessarily be ultra vires.'7 S This implies that traditional nonCharter injunctions would not be available against the Crown in
many cases where a Charter right has been violated. However, the
Supreme Court did not appear to consider traditional Crown immunity to a certain remedy to be a decisive obstacle. For example,
in Operation Dismantle,7 9 the Supreme Court found that the
Royal Prerogative's traditional immunity did not limit the Court
in its power to review Cabinet decisions. Similarly, in the nonCharter constitutional case Air Canada v. Attorney-General of
British Columbia,'" the Supreme Court issued a mandamus
against the Province so that a suit challenging the constitutionality
of a tax could commence. An interesting perspective on Crown immunity under the Charter appears in the Federal Court decision of
1
L6vesque v. Attorney General of Canada,'8 where Justice Rouleau
stated:
If the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which is part
of the Constitution of Canada, is the supreme law of the coun176. There is still much confusion about the precise meaning of section 32(1) of the
Charter, providing:
This Charter applies
(a) to the Parliament and Government of Canada in respect to all matters
within the authority of Parliament including all matters relating to the
Yukon Territories and the Northwest Territories; and
(b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all
matters within the authority of the legislature of each province.
Generally, it has been interpreted to deny that the Charter may be applied to private relationships without any intervening state action. See R.W.D.S.U., Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Limited, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 (Can.); see also DUSSAULT & BORGEAT, supra note 161, at
55-73; Roger Tass6, Application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in THE
CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS, supra note 114, at 97-101.
177. See Conseil des Ports Nationaux v. Langelier, [1969] S.C.R. 60, 73-75 (Can.); see
also SHARPE, supra note 175, at 170-78; Janice J. Tokar, Administrative Law: Injunctive
Relief Against the Crown, 15 MANITOBA L.J. 97 (1985).
178. [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 964-65. Id. at 897 (Lamer J., dissenting). Both Justices McIntyre
and Lamer are apparently of the opinion that a constitutional violation will not render, per
se, the impugned act ultra-vires.
179. Operation Dismantle v. R., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, 455 (Can.). Id. at 463-64 (Wilson
J., dissenting).
180. [1986] 2 S.C.R. 539 (Can.).
181. [1986] 2 F.C. 287 (Fed. Ct. T.D.) (Can.).
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try, it applies to everyone, including the Crown or a Minister
acting in his capacity as a representative of the Crown. Accordingly, a fortiori, the Crown or one of its representatives cannot
take refuge in any kind of declinatory exception or rule of immunity derived from the common law so as to avoid giving effect to the Charter.8"
In that case, a writ of mandamus was issued against the Chief
Electoral Officer to draw up an election list of prisoners. More recently, the Supreme Court of Canada found that absolute
prosecutorial immunity impinged on the right to an appropriate
and just remedy afforded by Section 24(1). The Court therefore
lifted the immunity, authorizing a claim for damages by a claimant
who had been improperly accused of murder. 183 These cases illustrate the inadequacy of existing common law and statutory rules
on Crown immunity and the willingness of Canadian courts to create a special regime of limited Crown immunity with respect to
enforcement of Charter rights.
b.

Discretionary Nature of Remedies

As shown earlier, Section 24(1) of the Charter confers a constitutional right to obtain a remedy, thereby insuring the vindication
of rights provided by the Charter. The entitlement to a remedy
"appropriate and just in the circumstances" is therefore
not subject to the judge's discretion."" This stands in contrast to the fundamentally discretionary nature of prerogative writs and injunction."8 5 These discretionary remedies may be refused for a number
of reasons, including the conduct of the applicant-waiver or acquiescence, unreasonable delays, unclean hands-futility, availability of alternative remedies, and infra-jurisdictional errors of law
that are not patently unreasonable. 8 It has been suggested that,
when a writ or an injunction is used in conjunction with Section
24(1) of the Charter, the remedy is discretionary above and beyond
the fact that it must be "just and reasonable."' 8 7 A better view,
182. Id. at 296-97 (emphasis added).
183. Nelles v. Ontario, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170 (Can.); see New Brunswick Broadcasting Co.
v. Nova Scotia, [1991] 80 D.L.R. (4th) 11 (N.S.C.A.) (immunity of provincial legislature cannot bar enforcement of the Charter); HOGG,supra note 166, at 26, 35; Sgayias, supra note
174, at 55-58, 67.
184. See R. v. Rahey, [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 618-22.
185. See JONES & DE VILLARS, supra note 171, at 372-75, 391.
186. Id; see also DUSSAULT & BORGEAT, supra note 161, at 410-97.
187. Prerogative relief is discretionary; doubly so, in fact, because, in addition to
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however, would be that the constitutional nature of the Section
24(1) remedy necessarily transcends any discretion which the judge
may possess at common law. It seems difficult to defend the position that the judge would suddenly have wider discretion just because the applicant used a writ in addition to the Charter remedy.
Once the violation of a Charter right has been proven, the applicant has an irreducible right to redress in the form of an "appropriate and just" remedy. At the stage of devising such an appropriate and just remedy, and at that stage only, the judge enjoys an
unfettered discretion, entitling the judge to consider factors such
as the public interest.188 A remedy deleterious to the public interest would clearly be inappropriate. Thus, the discretionary nature
of prerogative writs and injunctions at common law constitutes a
further barrier to the possibility of using such remedies pursuant
to Section 24(1) of the Charter without significantly affecting their
characteristics.
c.

Statutory Limitations

Prerogative writs and many ordinary remedies, such as injunctions, are governed by provincial and federal statutes, which, for
the most part, were enacted prior to the inception of the Charter
in 1982. These statutes contain limitations on the use of extraordinary remedies and injunctions, and the constitutionality of these
restrictions is subject to exacting scrutiny under Section 1 of the
Charter. 189 Limitations upon ordinary rights may not necessarily
be reasonable when applied to constitutional rights, and thus the
use of prerogative writs and injunctions in the context of Section
the general discretion bestowed by the "appropriate and just" provision of Section 24(1), the prerogative remedies are inherently discretionary-available only
where, in the court's opinion, exceptional circumstances justify their use.
Being an equitable remedy, injunction is inherently discretionary, quite apart
from the "appropriate and just" requirement of section 24(1).
Gibson & Gibson, supra note 114, at 811, 815.
188. Manitoba (A.G.) v. Metropolitan Stores Ltd., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 110, 146 (Can.).
189. Section 1 of the Charter provides that: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."
The Supreme Court of Canada articulated the components of the test under that provision in R. v. Oakes, [19861 1 S.C.R. 103, 105-06 (Can.). For an interesting analysis of the
progression of the Oakes test, see Errol P. Mendes, In Search of a Theory of Social Justice:
The Supreme Court Reconceives the Oakes Test, 24 R.J.T. 1 (1990).
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24(1) of the Charter may lead to the invalidation of legislation.e

°

Apart from this difficulty, statutory limitations also raise the
issue of privative clauses which prohibit recourse to writs as well as
to injunctions. The Supreme Court of Canada has established that
the provinces cannot enact a privative clause precluding judicial
review in the case of an administrative body acting ultra vires.191
Because most privative clauses are found at the provincial level,
particularly in Quebec where they are systematically inserted in
legislation governing administrative bodies, courts will be constantly confronted with the task of classifying errors as jurisdictional or not jurisdictional to decide whether the administrative
body has acted ultra-vires. In Mills, the Supreme Court clearly rejected the concept that a Charter violation would necessarily entail
loss of jurisdiction. As Justice McIntyre stated: "In my view, the
fact that a Charter right has been infringed does not in itself give
rise to jurisdictional error, and I see no basis for the characterization of some Charter violations as jurisdictional while others are
not. ' 192 Indeed, as one author astutely remarked: "[T]he concept
of jurisdiction can be manipulated so that the errors which a court
wants to review become jurisdictional errors.""1 9 The need to rely
on such a Procrustean bed to obtain a remedy pursuant to Section
24(1) appears antithetical to the substantive right to redress provided by that provision.
d.

Effectiveness

The question of effectiveness refers specifically to declaratory
actions and motions, an attractive common law alternative to injunction since injunction generally does not lie against the
Crown. 9' While such a description may be accurate in a non-constitutional context, considering that the Crown rarely disregards a
declaratory decision even though it may be unenforceable, its validity in the constitutional context of Section 24(1) of the Charter
190. See, for instance, the discussion of the uncertain constitutionality of the statutory
provision mandating notice to the Attorney Generals of any constitutional challenge of any
laws, infra note 246 and accompanying text.
191. Crevier v. Quebec, (A.G.) [1981] 2 S.C.R. 220 (Can.); Quebec (A.G.) v. Farrah,
[1978] 2 S.C.R. 638 (Can.); see generally DUSSAULT & BORGEAT, supra note 161, at 44-46, 73147; JONES & DE VILLARS, supra note 171, at 419-26.
192. Mills, [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 965. Id. at 879 (Lamer J., dissenting).
193. Roach, supra note 114, at 250.
194. SHARPE, supra note 175, at 173; Tokar, supra note 177, at 98.
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must be questioned. First, a declaratory action does not provide
interim relief since "there is no such 'animal' as an interim declaration."'19 More fundamentally, there are difficulties in defining a
declaratory decision as an "appropriate and just" remedy, given its
unenforceability. In order to be appropriate and just, a remedy
must be effective in ensuring actual redress of the Charter violation. Such a concept is found in Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights,' and the European Court of Human
Rights has held that the power to render a binding decision and
the power to enforce it are essential parts of any effective rem' The same elements are also present in the notion of an "apedy. 97
propriate and just" remedy under the Charter. The same is also
found in Article 2(3)(c) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which provides that "the competent authorities
shall enforce such remedy when granted."' 9 8 As noted previously,
the Supreme Court has declared that the Charter is presumed to
grant a protection at least equal to that provided by international
treaties ratified by Canada.'9 9 Surely, a hollow remedy such as a
non-enforceable constitutional declaration may be considered
equivalent to no remedy at all. This is not to say that declarations
will never be appropriate and just, but rather that they will not
always be a constitutionally adequate alternative to a more forceful
judicial order.20
195. Tokar, supra note 177, at 98. The importance of interlocutory relief in Charter
litigation is underlined by the fact that an injunction, which can be granted on an interlocutory basis, has been a preferred remedy in Charter litigation. Jamie Cassels, An Inconvenient Balance: The Injunction as a CharterRemedy, in REMEDIES: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES
271, 277-79 (Jeffrey Berryman ed., 1991).
196. See European Convention, supra note 12.
197. Silver v. United Kingdom, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 347, 381-82 (1983); see Plattform
"Arzte ftir das Leben", 139 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 29 (1988); MERTENS, supra note 15, at
78-88; Karel Vasak, L'Application des droits de l'homme et des libert~s fondamentales par
les juridictions nationales, in DROIT COMMUNAUTAIRE ET DROIT NATIONAL-SEMAINE DE
BRUGES 1965, at 336, 337-38 (1965); Jacques Velu, Les voies de droit ouvertes aux individus
devant les instances nationalesen cas de violation de la Convention europ~enne des droits
de l'homme, in LES RECOURS DES INDIVIDUS DEVANT LES INSTANCES NATIONALES EN CAS DE
VIOLATION DU DROIT EUROP9EN 187, 198 (1978).
198. International Covenant, supra note 11.
199. See supra note 14; see also H. Scott Fairley, PrivateLaw Remedial Principlesand
the Charter: Can the Old Dog Wag this New Tail? in REMEDIES: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVE
313, 324 (Jeffrey Berryman ed., 1991).
200. This is verified by judicial decisions applying section 24(1): "Five years of Charter
litigation reveal that a simple declaration of invalidity will frequently not provide a remedy
that is 'appropriate and just.' Moreover, if simple declarations of validity or invalidity were
all that was intended, s. 24 would not have been enacted." Brian Morgan, Charter Remedies: The Civil Side After the First Five Years, in CHARTER ISSUES IN CIVIL CASES 47, 48
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While many more illustrations of the inadequacies of ordinary
and extraordinary remedies could be found, the foregoing observations and analysis give some indication of the extensive procedural
modifications necessary to satisfy the requirements of Section
24(1) of the Charter. This may explain the progression of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this regard, which has evolved from
a single writ system without any specific Charter remedy in Mills,
to a declaration in Gamble that other remedies are superfluous to
Charter applications and that they may be disregarded when applying for redress pursuant to Section 24(1). The next logical step
in this progression seems to be the adoption of a single application
procedure under that provision. Such a unified procedure would
resemble the amparo examined in the first part of this study. The
following therefore draws a picture of what this single application
procedure would look like under the Canadian Charter, using as
inspiration the Argentine amparo.
D. Criteriafor Applications Pursuant to Section 24(1)
The remedial challenge posed by Section 24(1) of the Charter
will, in the oft-cited words of then Justice Dickson, "offer a test of
the creativity of the legal mind."20 1 In exercising this creativity to
fashion a recourse under Section 24(1) of the Charter, Canadian
courts should strive to instill the three fundamental qualities of
the Argentine amparo in creating a remedy that is fast, simple, and
effective.2 °2 The following comment by Roberts relating to amparo
can be applied directly to the context of Section 24(1) of the
Charter:
The protection of individual rights demands a judicial system
which affords effective remedies. Damage to fundamental
human rights often cannot be adequately restored by submission
of a complaint to the ordinary legal processes, which are typically dilatory. Extraordinary remedies, providing rapid judicial
203
relief, are needed.
The balance of this article thus attempts to define criteria for a
Section 24(1) application that meet these demands while con(Neil Finklestein & Brian Macleod Rogers eds., 1988).
201. Brian Dickson, The Public Responsibility of Lawyers, 13 MANITOBA L.J. 175, 187
(1983).
202. See VEscovi, supra note 24, at 483.

203. Roberts, supra note 57, at 832.
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forming to the precepts governing Canadian constitutional law. It
will be restricted to the parameters set out earlier, thereby focusing only on situations arising when a court of competent jurisdiction has not already been seized of the matter. Similarly, it will be
limited to non-criminal matters so as to avoid dealing with the
very particular concerns of criminal law.
In Argentina, in the absence of legislation, the procedure regu20 4
lating amparo was directly derived from that of habeas corpus.
It is not suggested here that the Argentine example should be followed in that respect, since Canada's legal resources in the area of
remedies are much richer than were Argentina's at the time
amparo was developed. Instead, elements of the proposed procedure should be drawn from existing vehicles available in all areas
of the law. In elaborating the procedural criteria for a Charter application, the same basic divisions used earlier to describe the Argentine amparo will be adopted: (i) acts giving rise to a Charter
application, (ii) procedural considerations, and (iii) elements regarding the resulting judgment. The term Charter "application" is
used here to signal clearly that this procedure does not take the
form of an ordinary action, but rather resembles a summary proceeding akin to motions or applications for writs and ordinary
remedies.
1. Acts Giving Rise to a Charter Application
The first elements to be examined are the identity of the parties and the nature of the violation giving rise to an application
under Section 24(1) of the Charter.
a.

Parties to the Application

THE APPLICANT.

As was the case for amparo in Argentina, any

person whose Charter rights have been personally and directly infringed can apply for a motion pursuant to Section 24(1). The victim will normally appear personally in court but, if that should be
impossible for any valid reason not necessarily related to the constitutional violation, a representative may apply on the victim's behalf. As with habeas corpus, strict formalities should be required to
establish the authority of the third party acting in the applicant's
name. Normal procedural rules that prevent pleading through a
204. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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third party should not stand in the way of the overriding public
interest in enforcing constitutional rights.2 0 5
Whether or not corporations can make applications pursuant
to Section 24(1) of the Charter is still unclear. The Supreme Court
of Canada has clearly stated that a corporation may raise as a defense in penal proceedings the inconsistency of a statute with a
provision of the Charter, even if the Charter right does not extend
to corporations. For instance, the Court in R. v. Big M Drug Mart
allowed a corporation to challenge a Sunday closing statute on
freedom of religion grounds, despite the fact that corporations do
not enjoy freedom of religion.20 6 This does not decide the question,
however, because a declaration of invalidity of a statute is not a
"remedy" proper to Section 24(1), but rather the effect of the
supremacy of the Constitution as provided by Article 52 of the
Constitution Act, 1982. Courts have applied a different test with
respect to remedies proper to Section 24(1), whereby a corporation
will be denied the right to an appropriate and just remedy if it
does not itself enjoy the violated Charter right. In a recent decision, Commission des &ole fransaskoise Inc. v. Saskatchewan, the
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal rejected a Section 24(1) application
by a corporate interest group seeking a mandatory order against
the Provincial government to enforce the right to minority language education guaranteed by Section 23 of the Charter. 0 7 The
court of appeal reasoned straightforwardly that "[o]nly those persons whose Charter rights have been violated are entitled to a remedy under s.24. A corporation has no s.23 rights and therefore cannot apply for a s.24 remedy based on a s.23 right."20 8 The question
of availability of Section 24(1) remedies to corporations therefore
depends on the much larger problem of the entitlement of corporations to substantive Charter rights, a matter still very much unresolved which lies beyond the scope of this study. Alternatively,
corporations could attempt to base their claim for a Section 24(1)
remedy on a public or related interest, a point discussed below. 0 9
The question of group application also poses a delicate problem. Whenever possible, a representative empowered by specific
205. See DALE GIBSON, THE LAW OF THE CHARTER: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 266-67 (1986);
Gibson & Gibson, supra note 114, at 789.
206. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 313 (Can.); see also Irwin Toys Inc. v. Quebec, [1989] 1 S.C.R.
927, 1001-04.
207. 81 D.L.R. (4th) 88 (Sask. C.A. 1992)
208. Id. at 97.
209. See infra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
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powers of attorney should be designated to apply for a motion in
the name of the whole group. As far as class actions are concerned,
the violation generally, if not always, stems from either a single act
or from multiple acts based on a single law, such that a single motion to have the act or law declared unconstitutional would suffice
to provide redress.21 0 This is one situation where a mere declaration can constitute an "appropriate and just" remedy since an individualized remedy will usually not be required. 1 ' If, however,
the violation does call for individual remedies, then an application
pursuant to Section 24(1) of the Charter would not be appropriate
to start a "constitutional class action," just as a private law class
action would be unavailable through such a procedure. 1 ' This aspect of Charter applications suggests that damages cannot be obtained through a Charter application, be it single or multiple, but
only through an action. ' 13 Notwithstanding such an inference,
"Charter class actions" should be permissible, but they should take
the longer, more painstaking road of an ordinary action because
the summary application proceedings are not suited to deal with
the associated demands.
The issue of whether a person who neither claims personal infringement of a Charter right nor claims to represent such a person, but rather applies for a Section 24(1) remedy on the basis of a
related or public interest, is a more difficult question. While the
Argentine Supreme Court has found that an application for
amparo may be made by a person with a substantial interest, the
situation is not as clear in Canada. The jurisprudence of Canada's
Supreme Court with respect to public standing has evolved in the
last twenty years to become more lenient. Generally, public standing rests on the presence of (i) a serious question to be answered
by the courts, (ii) a plaintiff with a genuine interest, and (iii) the
210. See Glenn, supra note 129, at 90-91; Robert J. Sharpe, Injunctions and the Charter, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 473, 479-80 (1984). For a discussion of class actions through
amparo proceedings in Argentina, see Augusto M. Morello, El amparo colectivo, [1985-II]
JA. 723 (Arg.).
211. For example, the right to have one's children receive their instruction in English or
French, entrenched in section 23 of the Charter, can be enforced by a single application for
the benefit of the whole community, since schools are not created for a single child. Sharpe,
supra note 210, at 480.
212. This is exemplified by articles 1002-10 of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure
(R.S.Q., c. C-25), largely inspired from the American legislation on class actions (Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), subjecting the initiation of a class action to a prior
judicial authorization, obtainable by application.
213. For a discussion of the possibility to seek, through an application, damages in
compensation for a Charter violation see infra notes 262-65 and accompanying text.

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:3

absence of a plaintiff with a clearer interest."" In dealing with
Charter litigation, courts have shown themselves to be flexible,
particularly in the absence of a potential claimant who is better
positioned than the applicant.2 1
THE RESPONDENT.

Since the Charter is directed exclusively to-

wards the government, the legislature, and other public or semipublic institutions, these bodies will always constitute the respondent in a Charter application. The inability to identify the precise
individual involved in the constitutional violation should not deter
a court from granting a remedy pursuant to Section 24(1). As Canadian law now stands, the Charter may not be invoked against
purely private acts of individuals, and therefore, some element of
state action must be present. The law is presently unclear regarding the possibility of importing to Canada the complicated doctrine of state action elaborated in the United States, and such a
question is beyond the scope of the present study. In this respect
Charter applications differ greatly from amparo since the latter
can be invoked against any public or private act trenching on a
constitutionally protected right.21
INTERVENORS.

The rule with respect to intervenors must in-

volve a balancing between the public aspect of the Charter rights
at stake in Section 24(1) applications and the need to keep the
procedure simple and fast. This balancing is best left to the judge's
discretion because such matters will vary considerably from case to
case. Courts generally have adopted a liberal approach toward intervention in Charter cases, where decisions are liable to affect
many who are not parties to the proceedings. If an organization or
individual appears genuinely interested in the decision and may
bring special knowledge or expertise regarding the matter at hand,
authorization to intervene will be granted.2 " 7
214. Canada v. Finlay, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 607 (Can.); Canada v. Borowski, [1981] 2 S.C.R.
575 (Can.); Nova Scotia Board of Censors v. McNeil, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 265 (Can.); Thorson v.
Canada, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138 (Can.).
215. See Canadian Council of Churches v. Canada, 46 C.R.R. 290, 297-301 (Fed. C.A.
1990) (Can.); Energy Probe v. Canada, 40 C.R.R. 303, 324 (Ont. C.A. 1989); see also George
W. Adams, Remedial and ProceduralIssues Arising from the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 13 QUEEN'S L.J. 301, 321-22 (1988) (finding the Canadian jurisprudence more liberal
than the U.S. in this respect); DUSSAULT & BORGEAT, supra note 161, at 413-35; GIBSON,
supra note 205, at 267-71; Gibson & Gibson, supra note 114, at 786-94; Michael J. Murphy,
L'intr t & poursuivre en vertu du paragraphe24(1) de la Charte canadiennedes droits et
liberts, 35 U. NEW BRUNSWICK L.J. 188 (1986) (Can.).
216. Kot, 241 Fallos 291 (1958) (Arg.).
217. See Rothmans, Benson and Hedges v. Canada, 45 C.R.R. 382, 388 (Fed. C.A.
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b. Nature of the Violation
Any act or omission, voluntary or involuntary, leading to the
infringement of a Charter right will open the door to an application under Section 24(1). The "failure to act" aspect is particularly
important, since it underlines the fact that the Charter imposes
positive duties on the government and the legislature. The right to
obtain certain services from the government, for example, imposes
a positive duty on the executive.21 8 The infringement of the Char-

ter right must be either actual or threatened and, thus, cannot be
merely eventual or possible. In R. v. Operation Dismantle, 9 the
Supreme Court of Canada implied that the violation need not necessarily have taken place by the time the application is made:
"[T]hey must at least be able to establish a threat of violation, if
not an actual violation, of their rights under the Charter.

'22

The

Vermette,221

Court in R. v.
stated the rule more clearly, finding
that an accused could present an application pursuant to Section
24(1) to stop an unfair trial that had not yet started. 2 On the
other hand, the Court rejected purely hypothetical violations as
valid grounds for a Charter application.
Charter applications may be used to enforce any of the rights
contained in the Charter. Somewhat surprisingly, the Supreme
Court in R. v. Gamble2 appears to have included habeas corpus
within those rights. Habeas corpus would therefore not be a separate application directly under Section 10(c) of the Charter, but
would be subject to the same rules as other Section 24(1) applications. Though technically different than the Argentine procedure,
1989); Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co. of Canada Ltd., 2 C.R.R.
(2d) 327 (Ont. H.C. 1990); DUSSAULT & BORGEAT, supra note 161, at 427-30; GIBSON, supra
note 205, at 271-75; STRAYER, supra note 174, at 195-97; Kenneth P. Swan, Intervention and
Amicus Curia Status in Charter Litigation, in CHARTER LITIGATION, supra note 129, at 2744; Jilian Welsh, No Room at the Top: Interest Groups, Intervenors and CharterLitigation
in the Supreme Court of Canada, 43 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REv. 204 (1985).
218. Section 20 of the Charter gives the right to receive government services in both
English and French.
219. [1985] 1 S.R.C. 441 (Can.).
220. Id. at 450. See also B6liveau, supra note 114, at 623; Gibson & Gibson, supra note
114, at 794-98.
221. [1988] 1 S.C.R. 985 (Can.).
222. Id. at 992 ("[S]ection 24(1) applies not only in the case of an actual interference
with the guaranteed rights, but also when an apprehension of such an interference at a
future trial can be established by the applicant."). See also Tyler v. Canada, 4 C.R.R. (2d)
348, 360-62 (Fed. C.A. 1990); Burke v. R., 29 C.R.R. 1, 4 (P.E.I. S.C. 1986).
223. [1988] 2 S.C.R. at 642.
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this approach to Charter applications accords with the principle
recognized there that habeas corpus is but a particular application
of amparo.22 4 Finally, the Argentine rule that amparo cannot undo
a contract does not have any application in the Canadian context.22 5 The Charter is not directed towards individuals but rather
towards the state, and the mere presence of a contract between an
individual and the state should not deter the court from granting
relief under Section 24(1) if the applicant's constitutional rights
have been violated.
The most important limitation to the Argentine amparo is the
prohibition of its use to challenge judicial decisions. 2 This limitation, however, falls beyond the parameters of this study since it
does not apply to situations where a court is not yet seized of the
matter. Suffice it to note that there probably exists a similar Canadian prohibition, given that the Supreme Court has repeatedly said
that applications pursuant to Section 24(1) do not offer a new appeal route.2 2 However, as in Argentina, the prohibition is but a
general rule since some rights in the Charter, specifically those included in Sections 11 to 14, can be violated only by courts. 2 8
Therefore, the rule is not absolute and some right to challenge a
judicial decision probably exists under Section 24(1) of the
Charter.2 2 9
Finally, the Argentine requirement that the illegitimacy of the
act appear indisputable from the allegation is not readily applicable to the Canadian law of applications under Section 24(1) of the
Charter. In Argentina, this rule was tied to the principle that
amparo could not be used to declare general norms unconstitutional. An act would be found manifestly illegitimate only if it was
not based on a statute or regulation, and was therefore amenable
to amparo. 23 ° No such limitation on general declarations of unconstitutionality exists in Canada. On the contrary, declarations are
224. Orgaz, supra note 67, at 1074, writes: "[Eli recurso de amparo constitute el g~nero
y el de h~beas corpus s~lo una especie dentro de este g~nero."
225. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying -text.
227. See, e.g., R. v. Meltzer, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1764, 1773-75; Mills, [1986] 1 S.C.R. at
958-65; id. at 899-903 (Lamer, J., dissenting), 978 (La Forest, J., concurring).
228. These include the right to a fair and public trial by an independent and impartial
tribunal (pt. I § 11(d)), the right to trial by jury (pt. I, § 11(f)) and the right against selfincrimination (pt. I, § 13).
229. See B6liveau, supra note 114, at 636-37.
230. Law No. 16.986 of Oct. 18, 1966, art. 2(d), 1967-A A.L.J.A. 500 (Art.); see BIDART
CAMPOS, supra note 58, at 249-50.
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mandated by Section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. Nevertheless, Canadian courts have been reluctant, based on a simple
application, to hear cases raising difficult factual questions. The
questions need not be tied to the violation. Instead, they will often
relate to the rationality test under Section 1 of the Charter,
whereby limitations on constitutional rights may be justified by social and political evidence. The Supreme Court of Canada has
stated that a full action is more appropriate than an application,
since the latter is necessarily limited. 31 Care should be taken, however, so that this limitation is not erected as a permanent barrier
against prompt enforcement of human rights violations in Canada.
2.

Procedural Considerations

Elements of pure procedure, not affecting substantive rights,
concern first the rules of the supplementary character and exhaustion of internal remedies as applied to Charter applications and
'3 2
second, the definition of a "court of competent jurisdiction.
a.

Supplementary Character and Exhaustion of Remedies

The allegedly supplementary character of Charter applications
was previously discussed with regard to prerogative writs, declaratory judgments, and injunctions. It was shown that these remedies
cannot be considered acceptable alternatives to a motion under
Section 24(1) of the Charter. Consequently, Charter applications
bear no supplementary relation to other remedies, and an applicant cannot be reproached for not having used these remedies. As
Justice La Forest remarked in Rahey: "In general, there is no reason why an accused should be barred from appropriate constitutional relief by the existence of a prerogative writ."2 33 This approach significantly simplifies the incorporation of Section 24(1)
231. Danson v. Ontario, 50 C.R.R. 59, 70 (S.C.C. 1990) (Can.); Wilson v. R., 30 C.R.R.
156, 158 (Man. C.A. 1987) (Can.).
232. The impact of specific rules of courts regarding applications falls beyond the scope
of this analysis, given that its aim is to assess what is constitutionally required, rather than
procedurally permissible. For a review of how existing court rules accommodate Charter
applications, see Sack et al., supra note 129, at 147 (reviewing rules in common law provinces); see also Michel Robert, Aperqu de la procedure r~glementant l'exercice de la cornp~tence des tribunaux en vertu de la Charte: L'opportunit6 de proc~der par action ou
requite, in CHARTER CASES 1986-1987, at 207 (reviewing rules in Quebec and in the Federal
Court of Canada).
233. Rahey, [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 631.
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applications into the existing procedural framework, eliminating
any need to perform the difficult task of prioritizing remedies.23 4 In
keeping with the set parameters of this study, nothing will be said
about judicial appeals save that they should be understood as the
consummate alternative.
As for internal administrative remedies, the administrative
law rule of exhaustion of remedies within the institutional framework where the decision originated should not bar an application
for relief under Section 24(1). 23 ' The reason is indirectly given by
Dussault and Borgeat in their overview of that rule:
Both the authors and the cases conclude that the necessity of
exhausting all available internal recourse is linked to the discretionary character of the power to superintend and reform.
One must therefore examine the scope of the discretionary
power as its purpose is to reconcile observance
of internal reme236
dies with observance of the rule of law.
We have already seen that the power granted to a court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to Section 24(1) is not of a discretionary
nature, but rather fulfills a substantive constitutional right. The
discretion which that provision bestows upon the judge relates
solely to the determination of a just and appropriate remedy.
Therefore, an application under Section 24(1) cannot be summarily
denied on the basis that internal institutional remedies have not
been exhausted. An examination of the merits is necessary. One
can hardly imagine that an order to remand to an institutional
body due to the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies would
ever be an "appropriate and just" remedy for a constitutional violation, since it would not in any sense provide effective redress. In
order to provide an effective remedy, the court must address at
least some substantive aspect of the application, even if it decides
to remand the case to the administrative body for further
consideration.
This interpretation conforms to the legislative history of Sec234. This consequence of both amparo and the Charter application's exclusivity was
also one of the major advantages noticed by an American scholar in his comparative study
of amparo and remedies in the United States. Schwarz, supra note 22, at 269 ("[Amparo]
possesses not only uniqueness and broad scope, but a simplicity and uniformity of procedure, in contrast to the United States' procedures.").
235. For discussion of the administrative law rule, see Harelkin v. University of Regina,
[1979] 2 S.C.R. 561 (Can.); DUSSAULT & BORGEAT, supra note 161, at 459-68; JONES & DE
VILLARS, supra note 171, at 348-53.
236. DUSSAULT & BORGEAT, supra note 161, at 460 (emphasis added).
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tion 24(1) of the Charter. The original proposal of Section 24(1)
stated that a constitutional remedy would lie "[w]here no other effective recourse or remedy is available or provided for by law
...
,,"37 This limitation on the courts' power under Section 24(1)
was later removed to give judges more discretion, "unfettered by
traditional or alternative remedies." '3 8 It can therefore be concluded that the subsidiary character of applications pursuant to
Section 24(1) of the Charter is weakened when compared to the
Argentine law of amparo and that the rule of exhaustion of institutional administrative remedies does not apply to a Section 24(1)
application.
b.

Court of Competent Jurisdiction

Section 24(1) of the Charter requires that a person seeking redress for a violation of rights contained in the Charter apply to "a
court of competent jurisdiction." The Supreme Court unanimously
set as the first tenet of this provision that there must always be a
court of competent jurisdiction. 39 Since the superior courts of each
province have nearly unlimited inherent powers, this requirement
does not pose much difficulty in situations where there is no extant
cause at the time of the Charter application. Charter applications
should be directed at those superior courts. A more difficult question is how to choose a court of competent jurisdiction when a
court other than the provincial superior court has apparently been
given jurisdiction by statute.
Jurisdiction can be broken down into three elements: jurisdiction over the person (ratione personae), over the subject matter
(ratione materiae), and over the remedy sought. We have already
seen that the Supreme Court of Canada in Mills held that a court
must have jurisdiction over all three elements in order to entertain
applications based on Section 24(1) of the Charter. 240 As one author has remarked, however, the remedy is not always known at
the time of the application, since the Constitution grants the court
discretion to fashion a just and appropriate remedy after having
heard the facts of the case.2 4 ' A court must possess jurisdiction
237. McLellan & Elman, supra note 8, at 207.
238. Nora Gillespie, Charter Remedies: The Structural Injunction, 11 ADVOC.
199 (1990).
239. Mills, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863.
240. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
241. Levy, supra note 129, at 537-38.
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over the person and over the subject matter before it can competently grant a remedy under Section 24(1).242 As for the particular
remedy granted, the Supreme Court has invited judges to be imaginative in creating new remedies. 2 43 Such remedies could be defined as being similar in nature to remedies generally accorded by
the seized court, following a principle similar to noscitur a sociis or
ejusdem generis. Such limitations, of course, do not apply to the
provincial superior courts, whose remedial powers know practically
44
no limit.
This principle requiring jurisdiction over the person, subject
matter, and remedy cannot, however, be absolute. The first tenet
of Section 24 demands that there always be a court of competent
jurisdiction available. Thus, the principle should state that a competent court should enjoy all three types of jurisdiction "whenever
possible." There may well be situations where the statutory
scheme regulating courts' jurisdiction will obstruct the attainment
of effective redress under Section 24(1). For example, the federal
court sitting solely in Ottawa may be out of reach for a remote
community in the northern regions of Quebec. In such a case, Section 24(1) of the Charter should directly empower a local court to
be seized of the matter. Otherwise, the applicant will be deprived
of his or her constitutional right to an appropriate and just remedy, merely because of the statutory division of jurisdiction. While
allowing limitations of constitutional rights, Section 1 of the Charter does not countenance their outright denial. In sum, if a choice
is possible, a court possessing all three jurisdictional requirements
will be preferred. However, if no such court is available, and the
delay incurred in seizing the appropriate court would cause irreparable harm, then any court should have jurisdiction to grant relief
under Section 24(1) of the Charter. As Roach says, the courts
would be exercising their discretion not judicially but
constitutionally.2 4 5
In general, the procedural aspects of Charter litigation under
Section 24(1) should not be allowed to unnecessarily derail an application. On the contrary, as with the Argentine rule of suplencia
242. See HOGG, supra note 166, at 696-97; Levy, supra note 129, at 537-38.
243. Mills, [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 955; see also Dickson, supra note 201, at 187; Fred Kaufman, The Canadian Charter: A Time for Bold Spirits, Not Timorous Souls, 31 McGILL L.J.
456, 464 (1986).
244. See Glenn, supra note 129, at 78-79.
245. Roach, supra note 114, at 271.

EMERGENCY JUDICIAL RELIEF

1992]

753

de la queja, the procedure should be afforded more flexibility than
is currently found in ordinary proceedings. For example, the rule
of mandatory notice to the federal and provincial Attorney-Generals when the constitutionality of a statute is in question, and the
related delays of up to sixty days, is subject to the reasonableness
test under Section 1 of the Charter. Some have suggested that a
limitation of this kind depriving any court of jurisdiction cannot be
reasonable. 2'

6

A less categorical view is that reasonableness de-

pends on the circumstances and, particularly, on the urgent nature
of the application, as well as on the degree of flexibility given to
courts by statute to waive the delay or the notice altogether.
It is important to note that the singularity of applications pursuant to Section 24(1) of the Charter generally has a simplifying
effect on the procedure used to enforce constitutional rights. This
is even more true of the Canadian Charter than of the amparo suit
in Argentina.
3.

Judgment on a Charter Application

A judgment according redress for a violation of a Charter right
must, according to Section 24(1) of the Charter, consist of a remedy "appropriate and just in the circumstances." What this concept entails will be examined after considering the question of declarations of unconstitutionality.
a.

Declarations of Unconstitutionality

We have seen that one of the major stumbling blocks in the
development of the Argentine law of amparo was the prohibition
against declaring general norms invalid through that procedure.
The rationale for such a statutory rule, to which many exceptions
were eventually created, lay in the opinion that a summary proceeding such as amparo could not serve as a rebuttal to the presumption that all laws are constitutional.247
In Canada, the situation is quite different. Declaratory actions
and motions are available to have a statute declared unconstitu246. See GIBSON supra note 205, at 275-78; Glenn, supra note 129, at 81; Levy, supra
note 129, at 524-27; McLellan & Elman, supra note 8, at 214; Danielle Pinard, L'exigence
d'avis pr~alable au Procureurggnkral pr~vue & 'article95 du Code de procedure civile, 50
R. DU B. 629, 684-88 (1990); Robert, supra note 232, at 215-16.
247. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
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tional2 4 s No formal presumption that a law complies with the
Charter exists, though such a presumption with regard to the constitutional separation of legislative powers can be found in Sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act of 1867.249 Applications or
actions under either Section 24(1) of the Charter or Section 52(1)
of the Constitution Act of 1982 may lead to a declaration of unconstitutionality, but the two provisions have very different purposes.
This difference, in the Argentine context, is aptly illustrated by the
distinction between the amparo and the direct action in unconstitutionality drawn by professor Bidart Campos: Amparo enforces
individual rights whereas the direct action in unconstitutionality
protects the integrity of the Constitution. 250 Likewise, Section
24(1) grants a remedy where there is a violation of a Charter right,
while Section 52(1) invalidates a statute when it is incompatible
with the Constitution of Canada. Section 52(1) is broader in the
sense that it allows for a declaration of unconstitutionality where
the statute is invalid on its face, even if no relevant violation has
taken place.2 51 Under this provision, no reference to Section 24(1)
of the Charter is necessary if another procedural vehicle, such as
an action, is used. On the other hand, an application pursuant to
Section 24(1) may also lead to a declaration of invalidity, since
Section 52(1) of the Constitution Act of 1982 may be invoked
through a Section 24(1) application.2 52
In a very recent decision, Schachter v. Canada,2 53 the Supreme Court of Canada appears to have taken the position that
Section 24(1) of the Charter and Section 52 of the Constitution Act
25
of 1982, provide alternative rather than cumulative remedies. '
The consequence of this approach is to limit Section 24(1) reme248. See Glenn, supra note 129, at 82-83.
249. A.G. Manitoba v. Metropolitan Stores, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 110, 121-26 (Can.). See also
Danielle Pinard, Le principle d'interprtationissu de la pr~somption de constitutionalitt
et la Charte canadienne des droits et libertts, 35 McGILL L.J. 305 (1990).
250. BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 58, at 124-27.
251. See R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (Can.) (corporation allowed
to invoke freedom of religion, even though it did not itself enjoy such a right).
252. See B6liveau, supra note 114, at 623; see also Glenn, supra note 129, at 82-83.
253. Schacter v. Canada, File No. 21889 (July 9, 1992) (Can.).
254. Lamer, C.J., writes:
An individual remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter will rarely be available
in conjunction with action under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Ordinarily,
where a provision is declared unconstitutional and immediately struck down
pursuant to s. 52, that will be the end of the matter. No retroactive s. 24 remedy
will be available.
Schachter, File No. 21889 at 44.
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dies to violations stemming from strictly individual acts of Crown
agents, not directed or encouraged by any statute, regulation, or
other legislative norm found to be inconsistent with Section 52.
Little justification is given for this position which severely curtails
the bredth of Section 24(1). The interpretation does not reflect the
different purposes of Sections 24(1) and 52, as discussed above.
Nor does it conform to the text of Section 24(1) which grants a
constitutional right to a remedy to anyone whose Charter rights
have been infringed or denied. Indeed, the wording of that provision suggests that a right to a remedy exists for any kind of violation and should not be limited to acts of a purely executive nature.
b.

Appropriate and Just Remedy

Section 24(1) of the Charter grants the judge wide discretion
to evaluate which remedy is "appropriate and just" under the circumstances set forth in the application. As Justice McIntyre remarked in Mills:
It is difficult to imagine language which could give the court a
wider and less fettered discretion.It is impossible to reduce this
wide discretion to some sort of binding formula for general application in all cases, and it is not for appellate courts to preempt or cut down this wide discretion. No court may say, for
example, that a stay of proceedings will always be appropriate in
a given type of case. Although there will be cases where a trial
judge may well conclude that a stay is the appropriate remedy,
the circumstances will be infinitely variable from case to case
and the remedy will vary with the circumstances.2 5"
Some members of the judiciary have been even more emphatic in
assessing the role entrusted to them by this particular provision of
the Charter. 2"
A judge's discretion to evaluate what remedy is appropriate
and just is, however, not unlimited. Indeed, it finds its limitation
in the substantive rights which the remedy is destined to enforce.
Professor Morel explains that some rights contain in their nature
255; Mills, [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 965-66 (emphasis added).
256. See Kaufman, supra note 243, at 464:
The very wording of this section-"such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just"-is, of course, a call for judicial ingenuity or, if you will, an open
door to activism. Indeed, some might say, and not without reason, that Parliament, in giving this power to the judges, virtually opened the door to the promulgation of laws by the judiciary.
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the remedy which will be appropriate and just. 57 For example, the
right to receive education in English or French, as guaranteed by
Section 23 of the Charter, would seem to mandate an order to provide such education if it is found that the applicant is entitled to
it. This principle is echoed by Justice Wilson's opinion in Rahey,
in which she concluded that a violation of the right to a speedy
trial can only be remedied by a stay of permanent proceedings.2 5 8
However, the members of the Supreme Court have not reached a
consensus on this point. In that same decision, Justice La Forest
disagreed with Justice Wilson, holding that the flexible criteria expressed in Section 24(1) of the Charter imply that there is never
necessarily one remedy alone available. 259 Nevertheless, it would
appear that the concept of "just and appropriate" as adopted by
the Supreme Court in Gamble2 60 more closely resembles Justice
Wilson's opinion that violations of certain specific rights by their
nature mandate a specific remedy.
The court's decision as to which remedy is appropriate and
just under the circumstances may rely on any element, as long as it
is relevant and has been properly brought to the court's attention.
One factor that the judge should consider is the general societal
interest. Some commentators have suggested that the public interest can justify denying redress completely if, on balance, it outweighs the applicant's interest in enjoying his or her Charter
rights. This suggestion does not seem appropriate. Considerations
of public interest should come into play only at the stage where
the*remedy is fashioned, since it is at that stage that the judge has
discretion.6 1 It may be that, in some situations, the most effective
remedy from the litigant's perspective is not appropriate because
of its injurious effects on society's interest. The court must then
devise a remedy reconciling the societal interest with the applicant's constitutional right to redress under the Charter.
The notion of a "just and reasonable" remedy raises a difficult
question concerning the award of damages. It is possible that a vio257. Morel, supra note 115, at 256-58. The same idea has been expressed in relation to
the right to an effective remedy under Article 13 of the European Convention on Human
Rights. Wolfgang Strasser, The Relationship Between Substantive Rights and Procedural
Rights Guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights, in PROTECTING RIGHTS,
THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION 595, 598 (1988).
258. Rahey, [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 620.
259. Id. at 639.
260. Gamble, [1988] 2 S.C.R. at 640-41.
261. See Roach, supra note 114, at 269-70.
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lation of a Charter right may be compensated by damages. This
possibility stems from the distinction between rights where the violation calls for restitution, and rights where the violation is irreversible, therefore calling for compensation. 6 2 Violations of a
Charter right by a Crown servant can be readily qualified as a fault
under the protean civil responsibility provision of Qu6bec's Civil
Code of Lower Canada, Article 1053.26 Similarly, the common law
provinces of Canada have incorporated certain Charter violations
into private law for the purpose of compensatory damages.2 4 The
problem is one of a procedural nature. This application under Section 24(1) of the Charter has its roots in such summary proceedings as prerogative writs and injunctions. Such procedural vehicles
are not well suited to sustain claims for damages, since they do not
allow the respondent sufficient opportunity to present an adequate
defense. Also, when damages are sought as compensation, the urgency that generally surrounds the redress of a Charter violation is
simply not present. Furthermore, as in all cases where damages are
sought, the quantum must be established. This procedure, which
often involves complex factual issues, goes against the summary
nature of the application. Finally, the compensation of prejudice
incurred by the fault of another is a right, therefore damages
would appear incompatible with the wide discretion granted the
judge under Section 24(1) to fashion a remedy appropriate under
the circumstances. For all these reasons, damages to compensate
for the violation of a right in the Charter should be sought through
an ordinary action in damages, not by an application pursuant to
Section 24(1) of the Charter. This approach was adopted by the
Federal Court of Appeal in Lussier v. Collins: "The rules of procedure do not allow such an order [of damages] to be made on a
mere motion; to maintain the contrary would seriously prejudice
'26
the right of the defendant to raise all his defenses. 5
262. See Morel, supra note 115, at 256-60.
263. "Every person capable of discerning right from wrong is responsible for the damage caused by his fault to another, whether by positive act, imprudence, neglect or want of
skill." 8 BIBLIOTHEQUE DU CODE CIVIL DE LA PROVINCE DE QUEBEC, art. 1053 (C. C. de
Lorimier, ed., 1883); see Glenn, supra note 129, at 85-86.
264. See Glenn, supra note 129, at 85-86; see also Ken Cooper-Stephenson, Tort Theory for the Charter Damage Remedy, 52 SASK L. REV. 1 (1988); Gibson & Gibson, supra
note 114, at 821-22; Morgan supra note 200, at 51-56; Pilkington, supra note 129, at 307;
Marilyn Pilkington, Damages as Remedy for Infringement of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, 62 CAN. BAR REV. 517 (1984).
265. [1985] 1 F.C. 124, 126 (Fed. C.A.) (Can.); see also DUSSAULT & BORGEAT, supra
note 161, at 409 n.256 (quoting Lambert v. A.G. Quebec, 3 C.R.R. 41, 44-45 (Qua. S.C.
1983)); R.L. Crane Inc. v. Couture, [1983] 6 D.L.R. (4th) 478; Johnson v. R., [1985] 16 D.L.R.
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On the other hand, punitive damages would not be subject to
this limitation and could be awarded by the judge as an "appropriate and just" remedy under the circumstances, since there is no
difficulty with quantum, entitlement, or compensation. Punitive
damages could prove adequate where a mandatary order against
the Crown would run afoul of societal interest. 266 Perhaps paradoxically, the purpose of punitive damages must not be to punish but
simply to provide the victim with a remedy for the violation of
Charter rights. As such, punitive damages under Section 24(1) represent more of a symbolic award, appropriate when harm to the
victim cannot be undone and did not generate any real pecuniary
or moral loss. The term "punitive" damages seems inappropriate
with respect to such an award and should perhaps be renamed
"presumed general damages" following a terminology suggested by
some academics in the United States. 6 7 Remedies under Section
24(1) in general, are of a corrective rather than punitive nature. As
pointed out by the Qu6bec Court of Appeal in a recent decision, R.
v. Latulippe,6 5 this connotation appears more clearly in the
French word "reparation"than in the English "remedy." In Latulippe the Court of Appeal refused to issue a contempt of court order as a Section 24(1) remedy because it would not have provided
a remedy to the victim, but only punished the violators. This corrective rather than punitive nature of Section 24(1) remedies echoes the non-punitive nature of amparo in Argentina, although different conclusions are reached as to the availability of. punitive
damages awards on Charter applications. 6 9 In the end, apart from
the possibility of ordering punitive damages, the rules proposed
here contain restrictions similar to those imposed in Argentina.
(4th) 441; Banks v. R., 21 ALL CAN. WKLY. SUMM. [A.C.W.S.] 2d 1 (Fed. C..Trial Div. 1983);
Dufresne v. R., 1989 RECUEIL DE JuR. DU QUfIBEC [R.J.Q.] 312.
266. For instance, in R. v. F (R.G.), 5 C.R.R. (2d) 62 (Nfld. S.C., trial div. 1991), a man

accused of five counts of indecent and sexual assaults sought to have his indictment stayed
because the proceedings had been adjourned for four days, one more than the statutory
maximum. The court agreed that the accused's constitutional rights had been infringed due
to the illegal detention, but found that quashing the charges would be inappropriate, and
instead awarded $1,000 in punitive damages against the Crown. See also Freeman v. West
Vancouver District, 24 A.C.W.S. 3d 936 (B.C.S.C. 1991) ($5,000 punitive damages awarded);
Crossman v. R., [1984] 9 D.L.R. (4th) 588 (Fed. C. Trial Div.) ($500 punitive damages
awarded). But see Vespoli v. Minister of National Revenue, 55 N.R. 269, 272 (Fed. C.A.
1984), and Pilote v. Quebec, 1986 RECUEIL EN RESPONSABILITt ET ASSURANCE 65 (refusing to
award damages absent proof of loss).
267. See Jean C. Love, Presumed General Damages in Constitutional Tort Litigation,
in REMEDIES: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 243 (Jeffrey Berryman ed., 1991).
268. 69 CANADIAN CRIMINAL CASES [C.C.C.] (3d) 365, 377 (1991).
269. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
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The unavailability of a damage award pursuant to a summary
application under Section 24(1) would have the same res judicata
effect for a final decision on a Charter application as the one governing the Argentine amparo 27 The decision reached on an application will therefore be res judicata only for Section 24(1) applications based on the same facts and between the same parties. Since
the nature and purpose of an action in damages are different from
that of a Charter application, the court in such an action would
not be bound by a decision on the Section 24(1) application.
In closing, interim relief should be available in any Charter
application if irreparable harm will occur before the court has had
time to reach a final decision on the application itself. The Supreme Court of Canada in Attorney General v. Metropolitan
Stores 71 stated that interim relief should be granted if (i) there is
prima facie proof of the Charter violation; (ii) the party seeking
the injunction will suffer irreparable harm, not compensable
through damages, if the interim order is not granted; and (iii) the
burden on the applying party will exceed any harm to the public
interest if the interim order is not granted. These criteria are identical to those developed in relation to interlocutory orders in
2 72
amparo applications.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The unsettled state of Canadian law governing applications
under Section 24(1) is directly due to the failure of the legislatures,
at both the federal and provincial levels, to enact procedural rules
for the enforcement of the Charter. While the law of amparo in
Argentina developed in a similar context, its evolution was the result of the thoughtful and prudent guidance of the Supreme Court
of that country. The potential for guidance is also present in Canada, though Canadian courts have acted with excessive conservatism, finding the appearance of creating new constitutional remedies repugnant. Although Canada need not directly adopt a foreign
body of law, there are valuable lessons to be learned from the development of amparo in Argentina. Ultimately, amparo should in270.
271.
land, 22
Morgan,
272.

Supra note 108 and accompanying text.
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 110, 127-29, 149-50 (Can.); see also Hardie v. Corp. of SummerC.R.R. 204, 209-10 (B.C.S.C. 1985); Gibson & Gibson, supra note 114, at 815-17;
supra note 200, at 56-59; Sgayias, supra note 174, at 49-58.
See Fix-Zamudio, supra note 27, at 339-40.
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spire the Canadian courts to develop Charter applications.
The ambivalent attitude of Canadian courts, attempting to
create new remedies, but not daring to abandon older ones completely, has led to a jurisprudence riddled with contradictions. As
we have seen, this. half-hearted effort is leading the Canadian law
of ordinary and extraordinary remedies down a dangerous path.
Traditional remedies risk an unnecessary transformation through
their application as Charter remedies. There is a need for the creation of a unique, all-encompassing Charter application pursuant to
Section 24(1) of the Charter, possessing flexibility, as well as the
more striking qualities of administrative, civil, and criminal remedies. Such simplification of the enforcement of Charter rights is
necessary to fight the "chilling effect" produced by the high costs
and complications of ordinary litigation. Unless this is achieved,
the vindication of constitutional rights will remain beyond the
means of many victims, especially those who find themselves in a
very vulnerable position when confronting the government. 7 '
Legislative action can at any moment intervene to regulate applications pursuant to Section 24(1) of the Charter. The rights conferred thereby, like all other rights embodied in the Charter, are
not absolute but rather subject to such "reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 21 74 Professor Hogg has suggested that without such
legislation there exist no limits to the courts' powers under Section
24(1).275 Canadian courts should not shirk from the task entrusted
to them by this provision of the new Constitution. They should
strive to develop a procedural vehicle that will allow Canadians to
enforce their constitutional rights in a manner that is fast, simple,
2 76
and effective, so as to fully implement the Charter.

273. See Langlois, supra note 143, at 247.
274. Charter, supra note 3, § 1.
275. HOGG, supra note 114, at 697. This statement is somewhat limited by the content
of the rights themselves. See supra text accompanying notes 257-58.
276. Section 24(1) of the Charter should be used in such a way as to bring about the
same beneficial results sought by amparo in Argentina.
[Els de congratularse, en efecto, que los ciudadanos de un pais, aun equivocindose, se habitfien a pensar con sentido prfctico sobre sus derechos constitucionales y sobre los limites que ellos imponen a las arbitrariedades de Ia autoridad o
de otros individuos. S6lo por esta prictica reflexiva y constante, puede lograrse
que una Constituci6n "viva" realmente y no sea mera literatura en el pais que
ella preside y gobierna.
Orgaz, supra note 67, at 1073-74.

